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gration in India based on the trade-off between consumption-smoothing, provided by
caste-based rural insurance networks, and the income-gains from migration. Our the-
ory generates two key empirically-verified predictions: (i) males in relatively wealthy
households within a caste who benefit less from the redistributive (surplus-maximizing)
network will be more likely to migrate, and (ii) males in households facing greater rural
income-risk (who benefit more from the insurance network) migrate less. Structural
estimates show that small improvements in formal insurance decrease the spatial mis-
allocation of labor by substantially increasing migration.
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1 Introduction
The misallocation of resources is widely believed to explain a substantial proportion of the
variation in productivity and income across countries. Past work has documented both dif-
ferences in productivity across firms (e.g. Restuccia and Rogerson 2008, Hsieh and Klenow
2009) and the misallocation of resources across sectors; most notably the differences in
(marginal) productivity between agriculture and non-agriculture (Caselli 2005, Restuccia,
Yang, and Zhu 2008, Vollrath 2009, Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh 2014). While this liter-
ature has devoted much attention to the relationship between misallocation, at the firm
or sectoral level, and cross-country income differences (e.g. Parente and Prescott 1999,
Lagos 2006, Buera and Shin 2013), relatively little is known about the determinants of the
misallocation itself.
In India, the rural-urban wage gap, corrected for cost-of-living-differences, is greater
than 25 percent and has remained large for decades, as we document in this paper. One
explanation for this large wage gap is that underlying market failures prevent workers
from taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities. A second explanation, based on a recent
paper by Alwyn Young (2014) is that the large wage gap solely reflects differences in skill
between rural and urban workers. In Young’s framework, there is perfect inter-sectoral
mobility and the size of the wage gap is completely determined by differences in the skill-
intensity of production between the rural and urban sectors. It follows that a country with
an exceptionally large wage gap, such as India, will be characterized by an exceptionally
large flow of workers sorting on skill. In contrast with this prediction, and indicative of
misallocation, we will see that internal migration is very low in India, both in absolute terms
as well as relative to other countries of comparable size and level of economic development.
The rural-urban wage divide is not the only symptom of spatial labor misallocation
in India. Rural wages differ substantially across Indian villages and districts, and studies
of rural wage determination have shown that shifts in local supply and demand affect
local wages, which would not be true if labor were spatially mobile (Rosenzweig 1978,
Jayachandran 2006). It is not that spatial mobility in India is generally low. Almost
all women leave their native village upon marriage (Rosenzweig and Stark 1990). The
question is why rural male workers have not taken advantage of the substantial economic
opportunities associated with spatial wage differentials in India to move permanently to
the city.
The explanation we propose, in the spirit of Banerjee and Newman (1998), is based
on a combination of well-functioning rural insurance networks and the absence of formal
insurance, which includes government safety nets and private credit. In rural India, informal
insurance networks are organized along caste lines. The basic marriage rule in India, which
recent genetic evidence indicates has been binding for 1900 years, is that no individual
1
is permitted to marry outside the sub-caste or jati (for expositional convenience we will
use the term caste, interchangeably with sub-caste, throughout the paper). Frequent social
interactions and close ties within the caste, which consists of thousands of households
and spans a wide area covering many villages, support very connected and exceptionally
extensive insurance networks (Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell 1986, Mazzocco and Saini
2012).
Households with migrant members will have reduced access to rural caste networks for
two reasons. First, migrants cannot be as easily punished by the network, and their family
back home in the village now has superior outside options (in the event that the household
is excluded from the network). It follows that households with migrants cannot credibly
commit to honoring their future obligations at the same level as households without mi-
grants. Second, an information problem arises if the migrant’s income cannot be observed.
If the household is treated as a collective unit by the network, it always has an incentive
to misreport its urban income so that transfers flow in its direction. If the resulting loss
in network insurance from migration exceeds the income gain, then large wage gaps could
persist without generating a flow of workers to higher-wage areas. Just as financial fric-
tions distort the allocation of capital across firms in Buerra, Kaboski, and Shin (2012),
the absence of formal insurance distorts the allocation of labor across sectors in the model
that we develop below. This distortion is paradoxically amplified when the informal insur-
ance networks work exceptionally well because rural households then have more to lose by
sending their members to the city.
One way to circumvent these restrictions on mobility would be for members of the ru-
ral community to move to the city (or another rural location) as a group. Members of the
group could monitor each other and enforce collective punishments, solving the information
and commitment problems described above. They would also help each other find jobs at
the destination. The history of industrialization and urbanization in India is indeed charac-
terized by the formation and the evolution of caste-based urban networks, sometimes over
multiple generations (Morris 1965, Chandravarkar 1994, Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006). A
limitation of this strategy is that a sufficiently large (common) shock is needed to jump-start
the new network at the destination, and such opportunities occur relatively infrequently
(Munshi 2011). Thus, while members of a relatively small number of castes with (fortu-
itously) well established destination networks can move with ease, most potential migrants
will lack the social support they need to move.
A second strategy to reduce the information and enforcement problems that restrict mo-
bility is to migrate temporarily. Seasonal temporary migration has, in fact, been increasing
over time in India (Morten 2012). The principal limitation of the temporary migration
strategy is that it will not fill the large number of jobs in developing economies in which
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there is firm-specific or task-specific learning and where firms will set permanent wage
contracts.
Both strategies discussed above will be used by rural households and castes to facilitate
mobility. However, the central hypothesis of this paper is that most men will nevertheless
be discouraged by the loss in insurance from migrating and the labor market will not
clear, giving rise to the large spatial wage gaps and the low male permanent migration
rates that motivate our analysis.1 Previous studies have also made the connection between
insurance networks and migration in India. Rosenzweig and Stark (1990) show that marital
migration by women extends network ties beyond village boundaries. Morten (2012) links
opportunities for temporary migration to the performance of rural networks. Both of these
studies take participation in the network as given, whereas we hypothesize that permanent
male migration can result in the exclusion of entire households from the network. The
simplest test of the hypothesis that this potential loss in network services restricts mobility
in India would be to compare migration rates in populations with and without caste-based
insurance. This exercise is infeasible, given the pervasiveness of caste networks. What we
do instead is to look within the caste and theoretically identify which households benefit
less (more) from caste-based insurance. We then proceed to test whether it is precisely
those households that are more (less) likely to have migrant members.
When an insurance network is active, the income generated by its members is pooled
in each period and then distributed on the basis of a pre-specified sharing rule. This
smoothes consumption over time, making risk-averse individuals better off. The literature
on mutual insurance is concerned with ex post risk sharing, taking the size of the network
and the sharing rule as given.2 To derive the connection between networks and permanent
migration, however, it is necessary to take a step back and model the ex ante participation
decision and the optimal design of the income sharing rule. In our framework, households
can either remain in the village and participate in the insurance network or send one or
more of their members to the city, increasing their income but losing the services of the
network. The sharing rule that is chosen in equilibrium determines which households choose
to stay.
With diminishing marginal utility, the total surplus generated by the insurance arrange-
1While we provide a specific risk-based mechanism to explain large rural-urban wage gaps in India, the
literature on international migration merely postulates the existence of “migration costs” to explain the
persistence of global wage inequalities (e.g., Chiquiar and Hanson 2005, McKenzie and Rapoport 2010).
2With complete risk-sharing, the sharing rule is independent of the state of nature, generating simple
statistical tests that have been implemented with data from numerous developing countries. The general
result is that high levels of risk-sharing are sustained, but complete risk-sharing is rejected (e.g. Townsend
1994, Grimard 1997, Ligon 1998, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, Angelucci, De Georgi, and Rasul 2014). These
empirical regularities have led, in turn, to a parallel line of research that characterizes and tests state (and
history) dependent sharing rules under partial insurance (Coate and Ravallion 1993, Udry 1994, Ligon,
Thomas, and Worrall 2002). The benchmark sharing-rule, in the initial period and when the participation
constraint does not bind, continues to be exogenously determined in these models.
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ment can be increased by redistributing income so that relatively poor households consume
more than they earn on average. This gain from redistribution must be weighed against
the cost to the members of the network from the accompanying decline in its size, since
relatively wealthy households will now be more likely to leave and smaller networks are less
able to smooth consumption. We are able to show, under reasonable conditions, that the
income sharing rule will nevertheless be set so that there is some amount of redistribution
in equilibrium. This implies that relatively wealthy households within their caste benefit
less from the network and so will be more likely to have migrant members ceteris paribus,
providing the first prediction of the theory.
Our analysis is related, yet distinct in important respects, from Abramitzky (2008) who
studies redistribution and exit in Israeli kibbutzim. For an exogenously determined (equal)
income-sharing rule, he shows that exit rates are decreasing in communal wealth (which is
forfeited upon exit) and that those with superior outside options are more likely to leave.
In our model, the wealthy do not have superior outside options, wealth is private and is not
forfeited, and the decision to participate and the income-sharing rule are endogenously and
jointly determined. In a second model, Abramitzky uses diminishing marginal utility, as
we do, to motivate redistribution. However, the sharing-rule is chosen such that there is no
ex post exit once individuals’ abilities and outside options are revealed. Genicot and Ray
(2003), in contrast, endogenize the size of the risk-sharing arrangement, but assume that all
individuals are ex ante identical, which implies an equal sharing-rule by construction. Our
model endogenizes both the size of the network (and complementary migration) as well as
the sharing rule, in a framework with heterogeneous households that builds naturally on
existing models of ex post risk sharing.3
While women’s migration at marriage diversifies the income of the network, migra-
tion by a male household member diversifies the household’s income and so is typically
assumed to lower the income-risk that the household faces (e.g., Lucas and Stark 1985).
The implicit assumption in our framework is that in the Indian context, the loss in net-
work insurance when an adult male from the household migrates dominates this gain from
income diversification. It follows that households who face higher rural income-risk and
who, therefore, benefit more from the network ceteris paribus, will be less likely to have
male migrant members. This second prediction is especially useful in distinguishing our
3Other studies in the migration literature; e.g. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) and Stark and Taylor
(1991) also consider the relationship between relative wealth and migration. We focus on the effect of wealth
inequality in the origin community on migration, whereas McKenzie and Rapoport study how migration
changes inequality in the sending community. Stark and Taylor study how wealth inequality determines
migration, as we do, but their theoretical predictions are driven mechanically by an unverifiable assumption
about individual preferences, which is that relatively poor (deprived) households in the sending community
have a greater incentive to migrate as a way of closing the wealth-gap with their neighbors. Their prediction
is at odds with the data, since we find (consistent with our theory) that relatively wealthy households are
more likely to have migrant members.
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theory from alternative explanations for large rural-urban wage gaps and low migration in
India. One alternative explanation for the lack of mobility is that individuals cannot enter
the urban labor market without the support of a (caste) network at destination. There are
also alternative explanations (discussed below) available for redistribution within the caste
and the increased exit from the network by relatively wealthy households. However, none
of these explanations imply that households facing greater rural income-risk should be less
likely to have migrant members.
We begin the assessment of the theory by showing that there is substantial redistribution
of income within castes, using data from the Indian ICRISAT panel surveys and from the
most recent, 2006, round of the Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS), a nationally
representative survey of rural Indian households that has been administered by the National
Council of Applied Economic Research at multiple points in time over the past four decades.
Following up on this result, we show (using data from a census of villages covered in the
2006 REDS) that relatively wealthy households within their caste are significantly more
likely to report that one or more adult male members have permanently left the village.4
The literature on migrant selection; e.g., McKenzie and Rapaport (2007, 2010), Munshi
(2011), indicates that migrant networks at destination support the movement of weaker –
less able, less educated, less wealthy – individuals. In our analysis, insurance networks at the
origin disproportionately discourage the movement of (relatively) less wealthy individuals.
Highlighting the role that rural income-risk plays in the migration decision, we also find
that households with a higher coefficient of variation in their (rural) income – who benefit
more from the rural insurance network – are less likely to have migrant members.5
Having found evidence consistent with the theory, we proceed to estimate the struc-
tural parameters of the model. Migration and the income-sharing rule are determined
endogenously in the model. Our estimates of the income-sharing rule indicate that there
is substantial redistribution within the caste, consistent with the descriptive evidence and
the tests of the theory. Counter-factual simulations that quantify the effect of formal insur-
ance on migration, leaving the rural insurance network in place, indicate that a 50 percent
improvement in risk-sharing for households with migrant members (which is still some way
from full risk-sharing) would more than double the migration rate, from 4 to 9 percent. In
contrast, (nearly) halving the rural-urban wage gap, from 18 percent to 10 percent, without
4We subject this result to robustness tests that (i) use alternative measures of income and independent
data sets, and (ii) that examine the relationship between the household’s relative wealth and its participation
in the caste-based insurance network. The latter test allows us to verify a key assumption of our model, and
that of Banerjee and Newman (1998), which is that migration should be associated with a loss in network
services.
5We assume in the model that entire households do not migrate, consistent with evidence provided
below, and that households with migrant members are treated by the network as a single collective unit.
If entire households did migrate, or if individual migrants and the family members they left behind were
treated independently by the network, then we would expect rural income-risk to be positively associated
with migration.
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any change in formal insurance, would reduce migration by just one percentage point.
2 Descriptive Evidence
This section begins by documenting the exceptionally large rural-urban wage gap in India
and its exceptionally low migration rates. We subsequently describe the role played by
rural caste networks in providing insurance for their members. The theory developed in
the next section is based on the premise that migration is accompanied by a loss in these
network services, connecting rural caste networks to the low mobility, and accompanying
labor misallocation, we have documented. This connection will be subjected to greater
scrutiny in the empirical analysis that completes the paper.
2.1 Rural-Urban Wage Gaps and Migration
An important indicator of spatial immobility is the rural-urban wage gap. To measure
the rural-urban wage gap in India we use the Government of India’s 61st National Sample
Survey (NSS) covering the period July 2004-June 2005. Schedule 10 provides, for a given
week during the survey period, the total number of days each person worked and, for
workers classified as regular salaried employees or casual wage laborers, their wage and
salary earnings both in cash and in kind. Based on this information, we computed a daily
wage for each rural and urban worker.6 Column 1 of Table 1 reports the mean of these
wages for rural and urban workers with less than primary education. We focus on this group
to avoid the confounding effects of differences in the returns to education in rural and urban
labor markets. Workers with little education will perform similar – menial – tasks in both
markets, and so wage gaps for them can be interpreted as an arbitrage opportunity. The
gap that we compute is very large - the urban wage is over 47 percent higher than the rural
wage. As a basis for comparison, Figure 1 provides the percentage rural-urban wage gap
in two large developing countries - China and Indonesia - computed from the 2005 Chinese
mini Census and the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) 4 (2007), respectively.7 As can
be seen, the wage gap for India, at over 45 percent, is much higher than the corresponding
gap for the other two countries, which is about 10 percent.
One reason that urban wages are higher than rural wages is that the cost of living
may differ across rural and urban areas. If the same bundle of goods consumed in urban
areas costs more in rural areas, then the wage gap in Column 1 of Table 1 may overstate
6The NSS, as do other Indian data sets, defines the urban population to include residents of cities and
towns that exceed a population-size threshold. This threshold has changed over time, as discussed below.
7The wage for Indonesia is the hourly wage based on payments and wage work in the week preceding
the survey for male wage workers aged 25-49 with less than primary school completion. Forty-eight percent
of rural male workers were in that schooling category. The cross-sectional weights with attrition were used
to compute the urban and rural means. The hourly wage for China is also for men aged 25-49 in the same
educational category.
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the real gain in earnings from migration. To adjust the wages for purchasing parity, we
used the consumption information provided in Schedule 1.0 from the same NSS. Schedule
1.0 provides the value and quantity for durable and non-durable goods consumed by rural
and urban households, enabling the computation of rural and urban unit prices. Table 1,
Column 2 reports the urban wage deflated by the Laspeyres index (rural or origin base) and
thus the real rural-urban wage gap. The PPP-adjusted urban wage is the nominal urban
wage, multiplied by the value of the consumption bundle of rural households whose heads
have less than primary education and then divided by the value of the same bundle based
on urban prices. As can be seen, while this correction for standard of living substantially
cuts the earnings advantage from shifting from rural to urban employment, there is still a
real wage gap of over 27 percent. To assess the sensitivity of our results to the choice of
consumption bundle, we used the corresponding urban consumption bundle, appropriately
priced for rural and urban areas, to deflate the nominal urban wage. Using this destination-
based deflator (the Paasche index), the real wage-gap is even higher, at over 35 percent.8
Although the Chinese and Indonesian data we use to construct the wage-gaps in Figure
1 do not allow us construct the corresponding PPP-adjusted statistics, the nominal gaps
provide us with an upper bound on the real gaps since urban wages will always be higher
than rural wages. It follows that the real wage gap in India is at least 16 percentage points
larger than it is in China and Indonesia.
It is possible that the 2004-5 year was peculiar. To gage how the real wage gap has
changed over time in India we use the nominal rural and urban wages estimated from the
NSS rounds for 1983-4, 1993-4, 1999-2000, 2004-5, and 2009-10 by Hnatkovska and Lahiri
(2013) to compute the real urban and rural wages. First we apply our PPP correction to
the urban wage series using the rural consumption bundle and unit prices from the 2004-5
NSS. We then apply the agricultural-worker CPI series and the industrial-worker CPI series
to the PPP-adjusted rural and urban wage series, respectively, to obtain an inflation- and
PPP-adjusted real wage series. Appendix Table A1 provides the nominal wages, the CPI
figures, and the deflated wages by year for rural and urban workers. Figure 2 plots the
movements in these wages over time. As can be seen, the real wage gap in 2004-5 actually
8As originally pointed out in Harris and Todaro (1970), migration responds to the expected wage; that
is, the potential migrant takes into account the probability of employment. Although in that article the
emphasis was on unemployment in urban areas, unemployment in rural areas potentially matters as well.
The NSS elicited, in Schedule 10, information on employment and unemployment in the past year for
all workers. The survey provides for each worker the number of months without work and whether, if
without work, the worker made any efforts to get work on some or most days. From this information
we computed the fraction of the year a worker was employed and/or unemployed for both rural and urban
workers. Interestingly, but perhaps unsurprisingly given the seasonality of agriculture, non-employment and
unemployment rates are higher in rural than in urban areas. We weighted real wages (where the nominal
urban wage is deflated using the rural consumption bundle) by the rate of employment (fraction of the
year employed) and by the fraction of days not unemployed, respectively. The expected earnings gain from
migration using these figures is higher than the employment-unadjusted real wage-gap (Column 2), lying
between 32 percent and 35 percent.
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underestimates the average wage gap over the period 1983-2009. After a sharp decline
between 1999 and 2004, the wage gap remains stable from 2004-5 through 2009-10 at over
20 percent. This stability contrasts once again with changes over time in other countries.
Using successive rounds of the IFLS, and adjusting for inflation, the nominal wage-gap in
Indonesia declined from 72% in 1993 to 11% in 2007. This is what we would expect as
infrastructure improved with economic development, facilitating increased migration over
time. Based on the NSS statistics reported in Appendix Table A1, the inflation-adjusted
nominal wage-gap in India declined by much less, from 59% in 1993 to 30% in 2009, and
most of this change can be accounted for by the decline in the wage gap between 1999 and
2004.
The change in the wage gap between 1999 and 2004 has two potential causes - a change
in the definition of “urban” and the general-equilibrium effect of increased rural-to-urban
migration. Hnatkovska and Lahiri conclude that almost all of the change in the gap is
due to the changing criteria for urbanization. By reclassifying some rural populations as
urban, one would expect that the average urban wage would decrease but with possibly
little effect on average rural wages. This is exactly what we see in Figure 2; when there
is a decline in the wage gap, it is almost wholly due to a sharp urban wage decline. If
the decline in the wage gap was due to rural-urban migration, then urban wages would
decline and rural wages would increase. To provide additional support for the claim that
the decline in the wage gap between 1999 and 2004 is not being driven by migration, we
report migration rates based on decadal population censuses over the 1961-2001 period.
Following Foster and Rosenzweig (2008), migration rates are computed for the cohort of
males aged 15-24 (who are most likely to move for work) within each decade by comparing
their numbers, residing permanently in rural and urban areas, at the beginning and the end
of the decade.9 These migration rates are plotted in Figure 3, where no spike in migration
is visible in the 1991-2001 period. Despite the persistently large (real) wage-gaps that we
have documented, rural-urban migration in India has remained low for decades, reaching
a maximum of 5.4 percent in the earliest period and dropping below 4 percent in recent
decades.10
9This method requires that mortality rates are similar across urban and rural populations. In the age
group 15-24, mortality is very low. The method also assumes that definitions of rural and urban remain
constant across the decade. The urbanizing of the population by redefinition, as described above, will inflate
the migration rates computed using the cohort method. The rates that are computed are thus likely to
be upper bounds on true migration. The 2001 census indicates that movement due to marriage by women
accounts for roughly 45 percent of all permanent migration in India, while employment, business, and the
movement of entire families accounts for just 39 percent of migration (similar statistics are obtained in the
1991 round). We consequently focus on male out-migration when measuring the spatial mobility that is
associated with the rural-urban wage gap.
10Although the detailed information needed to compute the migration rate from 2001 to 2011 is currently
unavailable, provisional figures from the latest 2011 census indicate that the proportion of the population
that is urban rose by only 3.8 percentage points between 2001 and 2011, to 31.6 percent (Ministry of Home
Affairs, 2011).
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It is possible that the wage gap we quantify (conditional on education) merely reflects
sorting on unobserved skill, and a large difference in the skill-intensities of production
between rural and urban areas of India, as suggested by Young’s (2014) model. We do
not think sorting on skill explains the large wage gap in India. First, agriculture became
more skill-intensive as a result of the Green Revolution in many parts of India starting in
the 1970s and prior to the economic reforms of the 1990s (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995).
In contrast, TFP growth in manufacturing was close to zero or even declining during this
period (Balakrishnan and Pushpagandan 1994, Saha 2014). Young’s model would predict
that the wage gap would therefore have declined in that period. It did not. Second, Young’s
model implies that migration rates from rural to urban and from urban to rural areas should
both be high where wage gaps are high to achieve the appropriate mix of skills in both
sectors. But in India, both urban and rural out-migration rates are low. An independent
measure of migration can be constructed from the nationally representative India Human
Development Survey (IHDS) conducted in 2005, which covers both rural and urban areas.
The survey provides information on the number of years that each sampled household has
been residing in the current location. We assume that a household has in-migrated if it
has resided in that location for less than 10 years. Based on this definition, and restricting
attention to households with male heads aged 25-49, the IHDS can be used to compute
urban-rural and rural-urban migration rates. These statistics are 1.06 percent and 6.48
percent, respectively. Using the same definitions applied to the male sub-sample of the
2005 Indian DHS, the rates are 5.55 and 5.34 percent. There is thus no evidence that the
exceptionally large wage gap in India is accompanied by a commensurate flow of workers, in
either direction, refuting the counter-argument that these gaps simply reflect differences in
(unobserved) skill.11 Even with the DHS statistics, which are substantially higher than the
corresponding IHDS statistics, migration rates are much lower in India than in countries of
similar size and levels of economic development. For example, the 1997 Brazil DHS, which
also includes a male sample, reports that urban-rural and rural-urban migration rates are
4.55 percent and 13.9 percent. The rural-urban migration rate, in particular, is more than
twice as large as India.
India’s unusually low mobility is also reflected in its urbanization rates. Figure 4 plots
the percent of the adult population living in the city, and the change in this percentage
over the 1975-2000 period, for four large developing countries: Indonesia, China, India, and
Nigeria (UNDP 2002). Urbanization in all four countries was low to begin with in 1975
11Young (2014) reports balanced urban-rural and rural-urban migration rates above 20 percent in his
sample of 65 countries. He uses DHS data and pools information on men and women. Men make up 10
percent of the sample. This is evidently unsatisfactory for India where 88 percent of women move outside
their village when they marry (IHDS 2005). These women are not moving to clear the labor market, and the
same problem arises in all other patrilocal societies in his sample. This is why we focus on male migrants
in the discussion above.
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but India falls far behind the rest by 2000. Deshingkar and Anderson (2004) show that
rates of urbanization in India are lower, by one full percentage point, than countries with
similar levels of urbanization, and that the fraction of the population that is urban in India
is 15 percent lower than in countries with comparable GDP per-capita. The exceptionally
low mobility in India, despite the apparent benefit from moving to the city, demands an
explanation. This is what we turn to next.
2.2 Rural Insurance Networks
In this section we show that transfers (gifts and loans) from caste members are important
and preferred mechanisms through which consumption is smoothed in rural India. Much of
the evidence is based on the 1982 and 1999 REDS rounds, which covered 259 villages in 16
major Indian states. Table 2 reports the percentage of households in the two survey rounds
who gave or received caste transfers, which include gift amounts sent and received as well
as loans originating from or provided to fellow caste members, in the year prior to each
survey. The table shows that even in a single year, participation in the caste-based insurance
arrangement is high - 25 percent of the households in the 1982 survey and 20 percent in the
1999 round.12 We would expect multiple households to support the receiving household
when it is in need of help and consistent with this view, sending households contribute 5-7
percent of their annual income on average whereas the corresponding statistic for receiving
households is 20-40 percent.13
A variety of financial instruments are used to smooth consumption within the caste,
with caste loans accounting for just 23 percent of all within-caste transfers by value. Nev-
ertheless, the 1982 survey data in Table 3 indicate that although banks are the dominant
source of rural credit, accounting for 64.6 percent of all loans by value, caste members are
the dominant source of informal loans, making up 13.9 percent of the total value of loans
received by households in the year prior to the survey.14 This is more than the amount
households obtained from moneylenders (7.9 percent), friends (7.8 percent), and employers
(5.6 percent). Tables 3A reports the proportion of loans in value terms, both by source and
purpose, using data from the 1982 REDS. As can be seen, caste loans are disproportion-
ately used to cover consumption expenses and for meeting contingencies such as illness and
marriage. For example, although loans from caste members were 14 percent of all loans
in value, they were 23 and 43 percent, respectively, of the value of all consumption and
12The statistics in Table 2 are weighted using sample weights and thus are population statistics.
13Some of these differences arise because sending households have higher income on average than receiving
households, indicative of redistribution within the the caste that will play an important role in the discussion
that follows. Nevertheless, it is easy to verify that the amount sent per household is less than the amount
received.
14We restrict attention to the 1982 survey because the classification of activities that loans are used for
is much coarser in 1999; in particular, consumption expenses do not appear as a separate category.
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contingency loans.15 In contrast, bank loans are by far the dominant source of finance for
investment and operating expenses, but account for just 25 percent and 28 percent of loans
received for consumption expenses and contingencies.
Are the statistics in Table 3A, representing the rural population of India in 1982, com-
parable to the current period? Table 3B describe loans by source and purpose using the
2005 India Human Development Survey (IHDS). This survey, conducted on a representa-
tive sample of rural households throughout the country, reports loans received over the five
years preceding the survey by source. Unfortunately the survey does not use caste-group as
a category, although it does identify loans from relatives, which we will assume are within-
caste loans. Although some caste loans will now be assigned to other categories (if they
are provided by caste members not directly related to the recipient), the basic patterns
reported from the 1982 survey round in Table 3A remain unchanged. Loans from relatives,
make up 9 percent of all loans by value, more than both friends and employers. Looking
across purposes, we see once again that informal caste loans are most useful in smoothing
consumption and meeting contingencies. Overall, lending patterns have remained fairly
constant over the two decades covered in Tables 3A and 3B.16
We argue in this paper that caste networks restrict mobility because comparable ar-
rangements are unavailable, particularly for smoothing consumption and meeting contin-
gencies. Table 4 shows that loan terms are substantially more favorable for caste loans on
average. It is quite striking that of the caste loans received in the year prior to the 1982 sur-
vey, 20 percent by value required no interest payment and no collateral. The corresponding
statistic for the alternative sources of credit was close to zero, except for loans from friends
where 4 percent of the loans were received on similarly favorable terms. The IHDS does
not provide information on collateral but does report whether a loan was interest-free. We
see in Table 4, Column 5 that caste (extended family) loans are substantially more likely to
be interest-free than loans from other sources, matching the corresponding statistics from
the 1982 REDS in Column 1.17
Tables 3 and 4 establish that loans from caste members are important for smoothing
consumption and meeting contingencies, and continue to be advantageous to borrowers
compared with loans from major alternative sources of finance in rural India. It is important
15Caldwell, Reddy and Caldwell (1986) surveyed nine villages in South India after a two-year drought and
found that nearly half (46%) of the sampled households had taken consumption loans during the drought.
The sources of these loans (by value) were government banks (18%), moneylenders, landlord, employer
(28%), relatives and members of the same caste community (54%), emphasizing the importance of caste
loans for smoothing consumption.
16NGO’s and credit groups, which have received a great deal of attention in the economics literature in
recent years are included in the “Other” category in the IHDS. However, these sources together account for
less than 2.1 percent of all loans by value received by rural households.
17Regression results with 1982 REDS data, reported in Table A2, indicate that caste loans are signifi-
cantly more likely to be interest-free than loans from banks, employers, and moneylenders. They are also
significantly more likely to be collateral-free than loans from banks.
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to reiterate that these caste loans account for a small fraction of all within-caste transfers
by value. The cost of losing the services of the network is evidently substantial and may
explain why individuals continue to marry within their sub-caste, which is a prerequisite
for membership in the caste network, today.
Figure 5 reports rates of out-marriage (i.e. marriage between members of different
castes) in rural India for the children and siblings of household heads over the 1950-1999
period, based on retrospective information collected in the 1999 REDS round. Out-marriage
is just above 5 percent of all marriages, closely matching other sample surveys conducted
in urban and rural India (IHDS 2005, Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006, Luke and Munshi
2011), and has remained stable over time. Recent genetic evidence indicates that binding
restrictions on out-marriage were put in place 1900 years ago and that the Indian population
today consists of 4,635 distinct genetic groups (Moorjani et al. 2013).18 These groups
consist of thousands of households. Marital endogamy, together with the fact that women
typically marry outside their natal village, allows caste networks to span wide areas, while
maintaining their connectedness. This connectedness across villages is complemented by
strong local ties, which arise as a consequence of the spatial segregation by caste within
villages. Households that renege on their obligations will thus be punished locally (in the
neighborhood) and in the wider caste community. Information will also flow very smoothly
through this inter-linked community. The analysis that follows examines the effect of these
exceptionally well-functioning caste networks on mobility and the rural-urban wage gap.
The central assumption in our analysis is that men migrating independently (and per-
manently) to the city cannot be monitored effectively by their rural communities and so
will be excluded from rural-based insurance networks. By the same argument, caste net-
works will not be able to function effectively if their members are spread thinly over a very
wide rural area. However, we also note that migration can be sustained without the loss
of network insurance if members of a caste move together as a group. The group can then
monitor its members in the city. A caste could use an analogous strategy to support co-
operation and reduce information problems when its members are spread over a wide area.
A single caste will not have a presence in each village, but instead will cluster in select
villages. This clustering shows up clearly in the 2006 REDS census, where the mean num-
ber of castes per state is 64, while the mean number of castes per village is 12. With 340
households on average in a village, this implies that a caste will have about 30 households
in those villages where it is represented.19
18These genetic groups are not restricted to the Hindu population. Muslims marry within biradaris and
Christians continue to marry within their original (pre-conversion) sub-castes or jatis. In our data set,
Muslim households report their biradari and Christian households report their jati.
19The pattern of spatial clustering we have documented has theoretical foundations. Jackson, Rodriguez-
Barraquer, and Tan (2012) examine reciprocity in societies where any two individuals interact too infre-
quently to support exchange but where the possible loss of multiple relationships (in the event of default)
can be used to support cooperation. They show that robust networks in such settings are social quilts: tree-
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3 The Theory
Our theory describes how the existence of well-functioning rural insurance networks can
lead to low migration. The theoretical structure we develop will be taken to the data,
allowing us to quantify the magnitude of the mobility restrictions. It will also be used to
generate testable predictions that distinguish it from alternative explanations for the low
mobility in India.
3.1 Income, Preferences, and Risk-Sharing
The basic decision-making unit is the household, which consists of multiple earners. The
household belongs to a community within which all its social activities take place. Each
household derives income from its local activities. Income varies independently across
households in the community and over time. In addition, one or more members of the
household receive a job opportunity in the city. The key decision is whether or not to send
them to the city.
We assume that the household has logarithmic preferences. This allows us to express
the expected utility from consumption, C, as an additively separable function of mean con-
sumption, M , and normalized risk, R ≡ V/M2, where V is the variance of consumption.20





Rural incomes vary over time and so risk-averse households benefit from a community-
based insurance network to smooth their consumption. Because our interest is in the ex
ante decision to participate in the rural insurance network, we assume that complete risk-
sharing can be maintained ex post (once the arrangement has formed). The advantage
of this assumption is that it allows us to derive closed-form solutions for the mean and
variance of consumption with insurance that lead, in turn, to a simple migration decision-
rule. This simplifies the theoretical analysis and later allows us to estimate a parsimonious
structural model. As noted in the Introduction, this assumption is, moreover, consistent
with evidence from all over the developing world, including India, documenting extremely
high levels of ex post risk-sharing.
The ex post commitment that is needed to support these high levels of risk-sharing is
maintained by social sanctions, which take the form of exclusion from social interactions
within the community when a participating household reneges on its obligations. These
like unions of completely connected subnetworks. Based on the statistics reported above, caste networks
appear to exhibit precisely these properties.
20This expression is obtained by evaluating log-consumption at mean consumption, M , and ignoring
higher-order terms. For the Taylor expansion to be valid, with CRRA preferences, consumption must lie in
the range [0, 2M ]. This implies that its coefficient of variation must be less than 0.31. The panel data that
we use, described below, satisfies this condition for 90 percent of households with food consumption and 70
percent of households with overall consumption (which includes durables).
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sanctions are less effective when someone from the household has migrated to the city.21
With full risk-sharing, the household is either in the network, receiving a fixed fraction of
the income generated by the membership in each state of the world, or out of the network.
We assume that households with migrants cannot commit to reciprocating at the level
needed for full-risk sharing and so will be excluded from the network.
Individuals migrate independently (and permanently) in our model. Their urban income
is private information. If a household with migrants is included in the insurance network,
it will thus have an incentive to over-report the value of its urban income ex ante, as a
way of increasing its income-share. Once the risk-sharing arrangement is in place, however,
it will have an incentive to under-report its income realizations ex post, claiming a series
of negative shocks, as a way of channelling transfers in its direction. Partial insurance,
which ties transfers to income realizations, will reduce the cost to the network from this
information problem, but it will not change the household’s incentive to misreport its
income. This “hidden income” problem is potentially more important than the commitment
problem in explaining why households with migrants will be excluded from the network.
Each household thus has two options. It can remain in the village and participate in
the insurance network, benefiting from the accompanying reduction in the variance of its
consumption, or it can send one or more of its members to the city and add to its income
but forego the services of the rural network.
3.2 The Participation Decision
Let MA, VA denote the mean and variance of the household’s income (which is the same
as its consumption in autarky) when all its members remain in the village. Denote the
mean and variance of its consumption if it participates in the insurance network by MI ,
VI , respectively. If one or more members move to the city, its mean income will increase
to MA(1 + ˜), where ˜ denotes the gain in income from urban wages net of any loss in
rural income due to their departure. This gain in income must be traded off against
the increased consumption-risk that the household will face. With network insurance,
(normalized) consumption-risk is denoted by RI ≡ VI/M2I . When the household sends
migrants to the city, it loses the services of the network and the corresponding risk is
βRA, where RA ≡ VA/M2A. The standard presumption is that the income diversification
that accompanies migration will reduce the income-risk that the household faces. Then
β < 1 even if a household with migrants has no alternative mechanism through which it
can smooth its consumption. As formal (non-network) insurance becomes available, the
21While the community could punish the remaining members of the household, this is not as effective as
punishing all members. One potential solution to this commitment problem would be for the remaining
members to separate themselves from the migrants. This is not a credible strategy, however, because
unobserved remittances can continue to flow within the household. The remaining household members also
have better outside options (through their urban connection) which reduces their ability to commit.
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risk-parameter β will decline even further. However, we continue to assume that migration
increases the consumption-risk that the household faces, RI < βRA. This is the wedge that
restricts mobility and allows a wage gap to be sustained in our theory. Note that this key
insight of our theory would apply with any model of ex post risk-sharing, as long as the
reduced access to the network resulted in increased consumption-risk for households with
migrants.
With logarithmic preferences, the household will thus choose to participate in the rural











where  ≡ log(1 + ˜).22 Given the standard assumption in models of mutual insurance
that there is no storage and no savings, full risk-sharing and log preferences imply that
each household’s consumption will be a fixed fraction of the total income,
∑
i yis, that
is generated by the N households in the insurance network in each state s of the world.
Let mean rural income, MA, be the same for all households to begin with. The income-
gain from migration, , is assumed to be uncorrelated with rural income and is private
information, so it follows that total income will be distributed equally among the members
of the network.




























Mean consumption with insurance, MI , is equal to mean consumption under autarky, MA.
However, the variance of consumption with insurance, VI , is less than the variance of
consumption under autarky, VA, for N ≥ 2.
3.3 Equilibrium Participation
Based on the decision rule specified by inequality (1), participation will depend on the gain
from mutual insurance, 1/2βRA − 1/2RI , versus the income-gain from migration, which is
 since log(MI) = log(MA). The key feature of equation (3) is that it implies that the gain
from insurance depends on the endogenously-determined number of network participants,
N , since VI and, thus, RI , is decreasing in N .
Because the gain from insurance depends on the decisions of other households in the
community, the number of network participants, N , is the solution to a fixed-point problem.
22If the terms in inequality (1) describe per-period utility, then both sides of the inequality would be
multiplied by 1/(1 − δ) for an infinitely-lived household with discount factor δ. This would have no effect
on the results that follow.
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To determine the fraction of the population that participates in equilibrium, we first derive
the threshold I at which the participation condition holds with equality. Let the  distri-
bution be characterized by the function F (). We then set the fraction of the community
that participates, F (I), to be equal to N/P ,
N
P
= F (∆M + ∆R), (4)
where P is the population of the community, ∆M ≡ log(MI)− log(MA), ∆R ≡ 1/2βRA−
1/2RI . ∆R is a function of N from equation (3) and so equilibrium participation, N
∗, can
be derived from equation (4).
We make the following assumptions about the distribution of : A1. The left support is
equal to zero. This assumption implies that average income must increase with migration,
highlighting the trade off between moving and staying. A2. The right support of the
distribution is unbounded. A3. The density of the distribution, f , is decreasing in . This
assumption says that superior urban opportunities occur less frequently in the population.
Given these distributional assumptions,
Lemma 1. Equilibrium participation is characterized by a unique fixed point, N∗ ∈ (0, P ).
∆M = 0 because MI = MA. ∆R > 0 by assumption. This implies, from assumption
A1, that F (∆M + ∆R) > N/P at N = 0. Assumption A2 implies that F (∆M + ∆R) <
N/P at N = P . F (∆M+∆R) is increasing in N because RI is decreasing in N (hence, ∆R
must be increasing in N). By a continuity argument, a fixed point N∗ at which equation
(4) is satisfied must exist. We show in the Appendix that assumption A3 implies that
F (∆M + ∆R) is strictly concave, ensuring that this fixed point is unique.
3.4 Participation and Income-Sharing with Inequality
We now characterize equilibrium participation and the income-sharing rule with heteroge-
neous rural incomes. By introducing this realistic feature of communities, we are able to
derive an important implication of our theory, which is that relatively wealthy households
within the community will be more likely to send members to the city. To derive the new
equilibrium, we take advantage of the fact that the ratio of marginal utilities between any
two households participating in the network must be the same in all states of the world
with full risk-sharing. Dividing the community into K income classes of equal size, Pk, this
implies, given log preferences, that Cks/CKs = λk, where Cks, CKs denote the consumption
of households in income class k and K (the highest income class) in state s of the world.
Aggregating over all households who choose to participate in the network – Nk in each
income class k – each household in income class k consumes a fraction λk/
∑
k λkNk of the
total income,
∑
i yis, that is generated by the insurance network in each state of the world.
Note that we normalize so that λK equals one. Following the same steps as in equations
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(2) and (3), expressions for the mean and variance of consumption with insurance in each














Because total income is pooled and then redistributed with full risk-sharing, consumption
in each income class is now a function of the number of participants, Nk, and the income-
sharing rule, λk, in every income class. However, equations (5) imply that the normalized








Participation in the network continues to be derived as the solution to a fixed-point problem,
but this problem must now be solved for each income class. Equilibrium participation will
satisfy the following conditions, corresponding to equation (4), for each income class k:
Nk
Pk
= F (∆Mk + ∆Rk), (7)
where ∆Mk ≡ log(MIk)− log(MAk), ∆Rk ≡ 1/2βRAk − 1/2RI .
If we knew the income-sharing rule, λk, we could substitute expressions from equations
(5) and (6) in equation (7) to solve simultaneously for Nk in all K income classes. The more
challenging problem that we face is that the sharing-rule λk and participation Nk must be
derived simultaneously. To derive the sharing rule that is chosen by the community, we
assume that its objective is to maximize the surplus that is generated by the insurance
network. This surplus is the utility from participation in the network minus the utility in
autarky, summed over all income classes. Within each income class, k, the total number
of participants is determined by a threshold Ik = ∆Mk + ∆Rk. Households with  > Ik
would send members to the city regardless of whether or not the insurance network was in
place. They can thus be ignored when computing the surplus generated by the network. If
β < 1, and given that  > 0, households with  < Ik will always send members to the city



















Noting that Nk = Pk
∫ Ik









23If β > 1, then there exists a threshold , 0 < Ak < Ik, below which households do not send migrants
to the city even when the network is absent. The second term in square brackets in the preceding equation
is then replaced by
∫ Ak
o
log(MAk) − 1/2βRAk +
∫ Ik
Ak
log(MAk) − 1/2βRAk + . We would then integrate
from Ak to Ik, rather than from zero to Ik, in equation (8). This would not, however, change any of the
results that follow.
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Equilibrium participation and the income-sharing rule can be jointly derived by maximiz-
ing W with respect to λk, subject to the fixed point conditions in equations (7), after
substituting in the expressions for MIk, RI from equations (5) and (6). We now use this
theoretical framework to identify which households benefit less (more) from the network
and who should therefore be more (less) likely to have migrant members.
3.5 Relative Wealth, Rural Risk, and Migration
If participation in the network were fixed, the community could increase the surplus gener-
ated by the network by redistributing income from richer households to poorer households
(given diminishing marginal utility). If households can select out of the network, how-
ever, the sharing-rule must be attentive to the possibility that increased exit by households
who subsidize the rest of the network will make it smaller, reducing its ability to smooth
consumption. We nevertheless obtain the following result.
Proposition 1.Some redistribution is socially optimal, which implies that (relatively) wealthy
households in the community should ceteris paribus be more likely to have migrant members.
To derive this result in the Appendix, we consider the case with two income classes,
k ∈ {L,H}, of equal size, PL = PH , where MAH > MAL. Recall that the threshold  in each
income class, Ik = ∆Mk + ∆Rk, and that the number of participants, Nk = PkF (Ik).
To ensure that differences in participation across income classes do not arise for other
reasons, we assume that RAL = RAH , which implies that ∆RL = ∆RH , and that the 
distribution, characterized by the F function, is the same for both income classes. Without
income redistribution, mean consumption equals mean income for each household and so
∆ML = ∆MH = 0. It follows that participation and, hence, migration rates will be the
same in both income classes without redistribution.
Denote the ratio of consumption between low-income and high-income households in
each state of the world by λ. Without income redistribution, λ is the ratio of mean-incomes
of the two classes, MAL/MAH . With equal income-sharing, λ is equal to one. In general,
λ ∈ [MAL/MAH , 1]. The sharing-rule λ∗ that is chosen in equilibrium cannot be derived
analytically. What we do instead is to focus on the (only) income-sharing rule without
redistribution, λ = MAL/MAH . We show that an increase in λ, evaluated at that sharing
rule, unambiguously increases the surplus, even after accounting for the effect on participa-
tion. This implies that there must be some redistribution in equilibrium. Migration rates
do not vary across income classes in the absence of redistribution, by construction. With
redistribution, relatively wealthy households benefit less from the network and so are more
likely to have migrant members.
The theory also has implications for how variation in rural income-risk affects migration
and redistribution within the network. The decision rule specified in equation (1) indicates
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that the gain from network insurance, βRA − RI , is larger for a household facing greater
rural income-risk, RA. This implies that the threshold I , above which it will send members
to the city is larger, and so it is more likely to participate in the network. However, we
must once again account for potential redistribution and its consequences for participation.
In this case, redistribution will favor safe households at the expense of households facing
greater income-risk. We are nevertheless able to derive the following general result.
Proposition 2.Households that face greater rural income-risk are ceteris paribus less likely
to have migrant members.
This result is derived in the Appendix. Income-classes, k ∈ {L,H}, are now replaced by
risk-classes, k ∈ {R,S}. where RAR > RAS . To rule out redistribution for other reasons,
mean rural incomes are assumed to be the same in both risk-classes, MAR = MAS . The 
distribution is also assumed to be the same in both classes. Relabel λ to be the ratio of
consumption between high-risk and low-risk households in each state of the world. Without
redistribution, λ = MAR/MAS = 1. If the two risk-classes are of equal size, PR = PS , then
the number of network participants will be greater in the risky class, NR > NS , because
∆MR = ∆MS = 0, ∆RR > ∆RS . The benefit of redistribution is that a dollar taken
from each participating risky household will be divided among a smaller number of safe
households. At the same time, the number of households that benefit is smaller than the
number who lose and this will be accounted for when computing the surplus. The effect of
redistribution on overall participation, with its consequences for consumption-smoothing,
must also be considered.
If there are net gains from redistribution, nevertheless, then λ will decline. However,
since the gains from redistribution arise because NR > NS , λ must be bounded below at a
level λ at which participation is the same in both risk classes; λ ∈ [λ, 1]. To prove Proposi-
tion 2 we focus on the (only) income-sharing rule with equal participation, λ = λ, and show
that an increase in λ evaluated at λ, unambiguously increases the surplus. This implies
that λ∗ > λ and, hence, that households facing greater rural income-risk have higher par-
ticipation rates (lower migration rates) in equilibrium even with redistribution. In contrast,
if networks are absent and we maintain the standard risk-diversification assumption, β < 1,
then households facing greater rural income-risk will be more likely to send migrants to the
city.24
24The available evidence supports the assumption that β < 1. As noted in Section II, the NSS data
indicate that there is lower unemployment in urban versus rural areas in India. Everything else equal,
this implies that income-risk declines with migration. β will certainly be less than one in that case, and
this is what we obtain when we estimate the structural parameters of the model. Without rural insurance
networks, a household will not send migrants to the city if log(MA) − 12RA ≥ log(MA) − 12βRA + . If
β < 1, and we continue to assume  > 0, then all households will send migrants, which is inconsistent with
Proposition 2. Once we introduce a migration cost, K, there exists a threshold ∗ = K− 1
2
(1−β)RA, above
which households send migrants. ∗ is decreasing in RA, establishing a positive relationship between rural
income-risk and migration in the absence of rural insurance networks that runs counter to Proposition 2
once again.
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4 Testing the Theory
The theory generates three testable predictions: (i) income is redistributed in favor of
poor households within the caste, (ii) relatively wealthy households who, therefore, benefit
less from the insurance network should be more likely to have migrant members, and (iii)
households facing greater rural income-risk who benefit more from the network should be
less likely to have migrant members. These tests shed light on the central hypothesis that
insurance provided by rural networks inhibits mobility. Additional tests validate the key
assumption that permanent male migration is associated with a loss in network services.
These results, taken together, can be used to distinguish between our explanation for large
wage gaps and low migration in India and alternative explanations that do not require a
role for rural insurance networks.
One explanation for low migration and large wage gaps in India is based on the existence
of urban caste-based labor market networks. While the members of a relatively small
number of castes with well-established urban networks will enjoy high wages in the city,
most potential migrants moving independently will be shut out of the urban labor market.
Past research; e.g. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006), Munshi (2011), indicates that caste
networks continue to be active in Indian cities. However, this does not preclude the co-
existence of our theory, in which the loss in rural insurance reduces individual migration,
with this alternative explanation in which migrants must move as a group, which results
in lower overall mobility. Two distinguishing features of our theory are (i) that households
facing greater rural income-risk are less likely to have migrant members, and (ii) that
migration is associated with a loss in network services.25
There also can be alternative explanations for the first two predictions of our theory,
but no alternative that we are aware of delivers all three predictions. For example, it is
possible that communities provide other types of public goods financed by a progressive
payment scheme, also resulting in redistribution and increased exit by relatively wealthy
households.26 Moreover, there may be other reasons why higher household income, which
is positively correlated with relative income within the community, will be associated with
higher out-migration. Neither of these theories would explain why households facing greater
rural income-risk are less likely to have migrant members.
25Another explanation for low mobility, as in the literature on kin-tax in Africa; e.g. Platteau (2000), is
that origin networks tax migrants heavily. However, this would not explain why greater rural income-risk
is associated with lower migration.
26Recent evidence from developing countries suggests that while payment schemes in rural communities are
indeed redistributive, they are regressive rather than progressive (Olken and Singhal 2011). The empirical
evidence thus runs counter to this alternative explanation.
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4.1 Evidence on Redistribution within Castes
We first empirically assess the extent of redistribution within castes. We begin with data
from the 2005-2011 Indian ICRISAT panel survey, which provides information on household
incomes over a seven-year period and consistent consumption data for the first four of
those years, for a sample of households in six villages in the states of Andhra Pradesh
and Maharashtra. The panel data enables us to compute the theoretically-relevant inter-
temporal mean values for consumption and income for each household.27
We divide up the households in each caste into quintiles of the within-caste income
distribution to compute mean consumption and mean income in each income class. Re-
stricting the sample to castes with at least 20 members represented in the data, we have
seven castes among 552 households in the six villages. Table 5, Column 1, reports relative
income, measured by the ratio of average income in the income class to average income in
the highest income class, averaged across all castes. Relative income is increasing across
income classes by construction. Column 2 reports the corresponding statistics for relative
consumption. A comparison of Column 1 and Column 2 indicates that there is substantial
redistribution within castes. The consumption ratio exceeds the income ratio for each in-
come class, with the consumption-income ratio in Column 3, or more correctly the ratio of
ratios, close to four for the lowest income class.
With just 500 households and 7 castes, the ICRISAT sample is too small to test the sec-
ond prediction of the model, which is that relatively wealthy households within their caste
should be more likely to have migrant members. The 2006 Rural Economic Development
Survey (REDS), collected information from over 119,000 households residing in 242 villages
in 17 major Indian states on the migrant status of each household; i.e. whether any adult
male (father, brother, or son of the head) had permanently left the village in the preceding
five years, the income of each household in the prior year, and its sub-caste affiliation.28 In
the data, permanent migrants are defined as those who are no longer members of the local
household.29 Non-resident household members who are temporary migrants are included
27These data provide the value of all foods and non-foods consumed, including self-produced and pur-
chased items measured at various times over the year, that can be summed to obtain an annual total. The
Indian CPI for agricultural laborers is used to compute real consumption values expressed in 2005 rupees.
Average real (inflation-adjusted) annual income is also computed for the same households over the entire
seven-year period, including wages, salaries, and farm and non-farm income, but excluding any transfers
and remittances.
28The selection of villages was meant to provide a representative sample of rural Indian households. Any
sample of villages will not yield a representative sample of castes, unless castes are distributed evenly across
villages. For the castes represented in the data, however, the income distribution derived from the randomly
sampled villages will be representative of the caste-level income distribution.
29We cannot determine whether any of the departed household members were formerly the household
head. There are few instances of entire households migrating in India - data from the 1999 and 2006 REDS
indicates that less than 10 percent of rural households that were present in the 1999 round could not be
located in the same village in 2006. The comparable statistic for Indonesian households from the first
two waves of the IFLS is 18 percent over just four years (Thomas, Frankenberg, and Smith 2001). The
Indonesian data also disentangle migration, which accounts for two-thirds of the missing households, from
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in the household roster, as is standard in most household surveys.
To test how relative income affects migration, we construct a measure of the household’s
average income over time. This will depend on its wealth (productive assets) as well as
the number of earners. A shortcoming of the REDS data is that it provides incomes only
in the year preceding the survey and includes transfers. To address this limitation, we
impute average income for each household using the ICRISAT panel data set and a vector
of household and village-level variables that are common to both the REDS and ICRISAT
data sets. Both data sets provide household-level information on total land area (together
with a binary variable indicating whether the household is landless), irrigated area, soil
type (red, black, sandy) and soil depth, household size, the number of earners, and the
occupation of the household head. Each data set also provides, at the village level, a time-
series of rainfall; daily rainfall for all seven years for the ICRISAT survey and monthly
data over an eight-year period starting in 1999 for the REDS, from which we construct
village-level mean annual rainfall and the variance of annual rainfall. When imputing
average income for REDS households with permanent male migrants, we included those
migrants among the earners. The land characteristics, taken together, determine the value
of land owned by the household. Although land wealth accounts for 85% of household
wealth in rural India (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993), land sales are extremely infrequent
(Foster and Rosenzweig 2002). This implies that land wealth is largely inherited and can
be treated as predetermined, at least from the perspective of current household members.
The household’s permanent labor income is determined by the number of earners and the
occupation of the household head.30
We first estimate, using ICRISAT data, the relationship between average annual house-
hold income over all seven years excluding all transfers and the vector of (common) house-
hold and village characteristics, including all the household characteristics interacted with
mean rainfall. The vector of regressors have sufficient predictive power, given that this is
a cross-sectional regression, with an R-squared around 0.3. The coefficients obtained from
the regression estimated with ICRISAT data are then used to impute average income for
each of the REDS households, based on their characteristics. As noted, the ICRISAT vil-
lages are located in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. For comparability, we restricted the
REDS sample to four geographically contiguous and broadly similar South Indian states –
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka – when imputing incomes.31
attrition. Assuming that two-thirds of missing Indian households also migrated, this implies that the annual
rate of permanent household migration is less than one percent.
30Occupational choices are very limited in rural India. In the 2006 REDS census, 34% of the heads were
cultivators; i.e. landowners and 38% were agricultural laborers and laborers not classified. The next most
popular occupation shopkeepers accounted for just 2% of the household heads. Not surprisingly, the most
important determinants of household income are landholding size and number of male earners.
31The advantage of including Karnataka and Tamil Nadu is that they increase the number of observations,
particularly in the structural estimation where households are aggregated by income class in each caste.
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Average consumption is also imputed for the REDS households from ICRISAT consump-
tion data using the same method and the same first-stage specification that was used to
impute average income.
Table 5, Columns 4-6 replicate the computations carried out with the ICRISAT data for
the REDS sample. A comparison of Column 4 and Column 5 indicates that, as is true for
the ICRISAT households (where no values are imputed), there is substantial redistribution
within castes. The consumption ratio exceeds the income ratio for each income class, with
the consumption-income ratio in Column 6, or more correctly the ratio of ratios, close to
three for the lowest income class.32 Finally, Column 7 reports migration rates by income
class. Consistent with the theory and the redistribution documented in Table 5, we see that
migration rates are increasing in relative income. A household’s relative position within
its caste’s income distribution will be positively correlated with its absolute income. The
statistics reported in Column 7 do not account for the direct effect of (absolute) household
income on migration, which would dampen the increase in migration across relative income
classes if wealthier households are less likely to migrate for other reasons. The regression
analysis that follows will control for the direct effect of the household’s income on migration.
4.2 Reduced-Form Estimates
Proposition 1 links the households relative income to its decision to send migrants to the city.
However, household income could directly determine migration due to credit constraints
or risk-aversion (Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak 2014). Higher income households also
have a larger number of male earners (on average) and this increases the probability that
any male will migrate. We thus include the households own income, as an independent
determinant of migration, when testing Proposition 1. Once this variable is included,
the relative income effect is captured by including average caste income as an additional
regressor. Conditional on the households own income, an increase in average caste income
implies that it is relatively less wealthy within its caste. To test Proposition 1 we thus
estimate a regression of the form
Mi = pi0 + pi1yi + pi2yi + i, (9)
where Mi indicates whether any male member of household i had moved permanently
from the village, yi is the household’s average income over time, and y is the corresponding
The reduced-form results reported below are largely unchanged and statistically significant when the sample
is restricted to the non-ICRISAT states (Karnataka and Tamil Nadu).
32Although we follow standard practice and ignore savings in our model of mutual insurance, an alternative
explanation for the observed pattern of consumption is that wealthy households save a greater share of their
income. This is unlikely to be a viable explanation, however, because private savings are extremely low in
rural India (as documented, for example, by Breza and Chandrasekhar, 2015). Consistent with a negligible
role for private savings, the structural model, which ignores savings, will generate estimates of relative
consumption that are almost identical to the consumption-ratios reported in Table 5.
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average statistic for its caste, which is constructed by averaging incomes over all households
in the caste. As discussed above, this information is available from the 2006 REDS census.
Conditional on average caste income, an increase in a household’s income implies that
it is relatively wealthy and, therefore, should be more likely to have migrant members.
However, household income could directly determine migration, as discussed above, and
so the pi1 coefficient cannot be used to test the theory. The key test of Proposition1 is
pi2 < 0; conditional on the household’s own income, an increase in caste income implies it
is relatively less wealthy and, therefore, should be less likely to have migrant members.
Table 6, Column 1 reports the estimates of equation (9). Coefficient standard errors
are bootstrapped to account for the use of imputed incomes. As predicted by Proposition
1, the estimated coefficient on caste income, pˆi2, is negative and significant. This result
provides support for the theory in which the migration decision is made in the context of
a caste network, and networks redistribute income in favor of the poor. The positive and
significant coefficient on own household income, pˆi1 in Column 1, is also consistent with the
theory but, as noted, there are other interpretations.33
Proposition 2 indicates that households who face greater rural income-risk should be less
likely to have migrant members. We test this prediction by including the rural income-risk
faced by the household as an additional regressor in Table 6, Column 2. Income risk in our
theory is measured by the coefficient of variation of the household’s income, squared. We
construct the variance of the household’s income over time using the same method that was
used to impute average income.34 Using the constructed variance to compute income-risk,
we see in Table 6, Column 2 that households facing higher rural income-risk are indeed
less likely to have migrant members. While this result is consistent with our theory in
which migration results in the loss of risk-reducing network services, it is inconsistent with
standard models of individual migration in which adverse origin characteristics lead to
higher out-migration rates.
Recall that the relationship between relative income and migration in Proposition 1
was derived conditional on rural income-risk. The relationship between income-risk and
migration in Proposition 2 was derived conditional on household income (and the house-
hold’s position in the caste income distribution). The specification in Column 2 allows us
33Our analysis with 2006 REDS data restricts the sample to castes with at least 30 households in the
census. This ensures that there will be a sufficient number of households in each income class in the
structural estimation, where castes are divided into 4-6 income classes. The reduced-form results in Table
6 are robust to restricting the sample to castes with at least 10 households in the 2006 REDS census.
34The specification in the first step, using ICRISAT data, is the same, except that the household charac-
teristics are interacted with the variance of village rainfall in the ICRISAT villages. The set of household
and village level regressors once again have sufficient power, with an R-squared around 0.3. The estimated
coefficients from the first step are subsequently used to predict the variance of income for each of the REDS
households using their characteristics and village-level rainfall variances. We estimate the relationship be-
tween log-variance and the household and village characteristics in the first step. Predicted log-variance for
the REDS households can then be transformed to the variance of income, ensuring that no negative values
are obtained.
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to (simultaneously) estimate these conditional effects, as required by the theory. The point
estimates indicate that the magnitude of these effects are large. A one standard deviation
decrease in the risk measure doubles the migration rate (from a baseline of 3.1%). A one
standard deviation increase in own income increases the migration rate by 10%, while the
same increase in caste income reduces the migration rate by 30%.
The theory does not specify what constitutes the domain of the network. Although
the organization of Indian society, with individuals marrying strictly within their caste,
leads us to posit that rural insurance networks are organized around the caste, they could
potentially be organized at the level of the village, as assumed in previous studies on
risk-sharing in India; e.g. Townsend 1994, Ligon 1998. To address this possibility, we
include mean village income as an additional regressor in Table 6, Column 3. Consistent
with Mazzocco and Saini (2012) who report full risk-sharing at the caste level, but reject
full risk-sharing in the village with ICRISAT data, we see that the coefficient on mean
caste-income is stable and remains highly significant, whereas the corresponding coefficient
on village income is small and imprecisely estimated. One remaining possibility is that
the estimated village-income coefficient is biased because village income is correlated with
village infrastructure, which directly determines migration. To address this possibility, we
include variables indicating whether a bank, secondary school, health center, or bus station
is located in the village, as well as the distance to the nearest town, in Table 6, Column 4.
Although the infrastructure variables are jointly highly significant, the remaining coefficient
values are largely unchanged.
We believe that the caste is exceptionally effective at consumption-smoothing because
of its large size and scope (extending over many villages). While the preceding results
indicate that insurance networks in India are organized around the caste, they do not tell
us whether the network extends beyond village boundaries. To answer this question, we
replace village income with the mean income of caste households within the village in Table
6, Column 5. Reassuringly, the complete caste-income coefficient maintains its size and
significance, while the restrictive caste-income measure has little effect on migration and
is statistically insignificant. The stability of the caste-income coefficient to the inclusion
of a vector of village-level variables indicates that the results are not being driven by
unobserved village-level effects.35 Nevertheless, as a final robustness test, we include a
full set of village fixed effects in Column 6. Although the caste-income coefficient is now
only statistically significant at the 12 percent level (one-tailed test), it remains as large
(in absolute magnitude) as it was with the benchmark specification in Column 2. Results
from a Hausman test (available from the authors) indicate that the difference in the caste
income coefficient between the benchmark specification and the specification with village
35Standard errors in Columns 3-5 are two-way clustered at the level of the caste and the village.
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fixed effects is not significant at the 5 percent level. The difference between the household
income coefficients is also not statistically significant, at any level. The only statistically
significant change is for the income-risk coefficient, but that coefficient is highly significant
in both specifications (and gets more negative in the fixed effects specification). Overall, our
results provide strong support for the hypothesized trade-off between the insurance provided
by rural caste-based networks and the income-gain from migration. Those households that
benefit less (more) from the rural network are more (less) likely to have migrant members.
4.3 Structural Estimates
Having found evidence consistent with the theory, we now estimate the structural param-
eters of the model. The structural estimates are used to (i) externally validate the model,
(ii) to provide independent support for the redistribution within castes that is predicted by
the theory, and (iii) to carry out counter-factual simulations that compare the sensitivity
of migration to the rural-urban wage gap and formal insurance. We also conduct counter-
factual policy simulations that quantify the mobility-enhancing effects of a government
safety net for poor households and a credit scheme benefiting wealthy households.
There are two exogenous variables in the model, measured at the level of the income-
class, k: mean-income, MAk, and normalized risk, RAk ≡ VAk/M2Ak. While there is a
single caste (community) in the theoretical analysis, there are 100 castes in the 2006 REDS
census, which we use for the structural estimation. To be consistent with the model, we
thus proceed to average mean-income, MAi, and the variance of income, VAi, which were
previously imputed for each household i, across all household in each income-class, k,
within each caste, j, to obtain MAkj , RAkj . The specifications that we report partition the
households within each caste into income quintiles, but the results are robust to using four
or six income classes.
To understand how the model is estimated, suppose, to begin with, that the β parameter
and the F function are known. For a given income-sharing rule in caste j, described by the
λkj vector, we can then solve for participation in each income-class, Nkj , from the fixed-
point conditions, equation (7), after substituting in the expressions for mean-consumption
with insurance MIkj and consumption-risk with insurance RIj from equations (5) and (6).
The total surplus generated by the insurance arrangement can then be computed in caste
j from equation (8). Searching over λkj , the income-sharing rule that is ultimately selected
in caste j will maximize the total surplus. If the model is correctly specified, predicted
migration (which is one minus the participation rate) will match actual migration at that
sharing-rule.
Now suppose that β is unknown and must be estimated, but continue to assume that
the F function is known. For an arbitrary β we can solve for the surplus-maximizing λkj ,
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as described above. However, predicted migration will no longer match actual migration.
To estimate β, we exploit the fact that migration in each income-class in each caste will
decline as this parameter increases. There thus exists a unique β for which overall predicted
migration, across all income-classes in all castes, matches actual migration. This will be our
best estimate of β. We match on overall migration to estimate β because a unique solution
is assured and because this moment will be the outcome of interest in the counter-factual
simulation that follows.
The estimation procedure described above was based on the assumption that the F
function, which characterizes the distribution of income-gains from migration, , was known.
We now proceed to describe how this function is derived. Recall that we made three
assumptions about the  distribution in the model: (i) the left support is equal to zero, (ii)
the right support is unbounded, and (iii) the density of the distribution is declining in .
The exponential distribution satisfies each of these assumptions and so we assume that  is
distributed exponentially. An additional advantage of the exponential distribution is that
it is characterized by a single parameter, which we denote by ν; F () = 1 − e−ν, where
E() = 1/ν.
The distributional parameter, ν, is estimated in two steps. We first use REDS and NSS
data to compute the average income-gain from migration for households with permanent
male migrant members in the 2006 REDS census. The household’s land value, the number
of working-age adults, and the education of the household head (which we assume applies
to all working members) is available from the REDS census. Urban and rural wages, by
education category, are available from the NSS. These data sources can be combined to
compute the income-gain from migration, ˜, and its utility equivalent,  = log(1 + ˜).36 We
assume that this derived income-gain, , is the representative (median) value for households
with migrants. For example, if 4 percent of households have permanent migrant members,
then  applies to a household at the 98th percentile of the  distribution. This assumption,






where x equals four in the preceding example. Once ν is computed, the risk-parameter, β,
can be estimated as described above.
As a basis for comparison with the estimates that follow, Table 7A, Columns 1-2 list
36We compute average rural income as 5 percent of the household’s total asset holdings at the beginning
of the reference period (one year before the survey round) plus labor income, based on the assumption that
the adults in the household work for 312 days in the year. Let V be the household’s asset value, L the
number of adults, and WU , WR the education-adjusted urban and rural wages from the NSS. The average
number of working-age adults per household in the 2006 REDS census is 1.4, and so it is reasonable to
assume that a single individual migrates. The income-gain from migration in that case is 312(WU−WR)
0.05V+312WRL
.
This statistic is averaged across all households with migrants.
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relative consumption and migration in each of the five relative income-classes (averaged
across all castes). Columns 3-4, report the β estimate, predicted relative consumption, λk,
and predicted migration, 1−Nk/Pk, in each of those classes, k (once again averaged across
all castes, j). Jack-knifed standard errors, constructed by removing one caste at a time
and re-estimating the model, are reported in parentheses.37 The point-estimate for the β
parameter is 1.4. Similar results are obtained with four and six income-classes in Appendix
Table A3. β < 1 if migration reduces income-risk, as commonly assumed. We will see
momentarily that β does decline below one, and is much more precisely estimated, with a
flexible specification of the model that does a better job of matching the data.
The β parameter is estimated by matching on overall migration, which is 4.3 percent.
Notice, however, that migration rates predicted by the model are lower (higher) than ac-
tual migration rates in low (high) income classes. In contrast, relative consumption levels
(λ’s) predicted by the model match closely with actual relative consumption. We cannot
reject that predicted and actual relative consumption are statistically equal, at conven-
tional levels, in each income class and across all specifications in Table 7A. The match in
terms of magnitudes is very close (less than 5 percent error for each income-class).38 This
close match in predicted and actual λ’s is effectively a test of external validity, given that
consumption data are not used to estimate the model. It provides empirical support for
both the (logarithmic) distributional assumption and our use of a utilitarian social welfare
function, placing equal weight on all income classes in equation (8). The substantial re-
distribution documented in Table 5 appears to be driven entirely by an attempt to equate
marginal utilities across income classes.
One possible explanation for the mismatch between predicted and actual migration
across income classes is that the income-gain from migration varies with rural income,
perhaps because members of wealthier households are better educated. Although the theo-
retical analysis assumes that the (proportional) income-gain is independent of rural income,
we relax this assumption when estimating the model in Table 7B, Columns 3-4. The house-
holds in the 2006 REDS census are divided into five absolute income classes, without regard
to their caste affiliation, and the ν parameter is then computed in each income class using
the procedure described above.39 Each relative income-class k in caste j can be mapped
37The jack-knifed standard error for any parameter θ is given by the expression [n/n− 1∑
i
(θi − θ)2]1/2,
where n is the number of times the model is re-estimated, θi is the parameter estimate when it is re-estimated
for the ith time, and θ is the average across all θi. In our case, with 100 castes, n = 100.
38An alternative approach to compare the closeness of the match, suggested by a referee, would be to
compute the probability that the predicted and actual λ’s are as close as they are by random chance. We
implement this test for the lowest relative income-class, since it will certainly not subsidize any other income-
class and so the range of feasible λ’s is known. Given that the relative income for the lowest income-class
is 0.31 from Table 5, λ must lie in [0.31, 1]. If the predicted λ is distributed uniformly over this range, the
probability that it will lie within 0.04 of the actual λ, as observed in Table 7A, is 12 percent. The standard
error for the lowest income class is also small enough for us to reject that there is no redistribution (λ is
equal to 0.31) with greater than 95 percent confidence.
39Appendix Table A3 shows, with five absolute income-classes, that land value, the number of working-
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into an absolute income-class based on its mean income, MAkj . The ν parameter computed
for that absolute income-class is then assigned to class k in caste j. The results with this
flexible specification in Table 7B, Columns 3-4 are very similar to the results obtained
with the benchmark specification, with a single ν, in Table 7A, Columns 3-4. Allowing
the income-gain from migration to vary with rural income evidently does not reduce the
mismatch between predicted and actual migration.
Although the theory focuses on the constraints faced by individuals migrating indepen-
dently, the empirical analysis must take account of the small number of castes that have
established urban networks in the city. While most castes report low migration rates in our
data, a few do have substantial rates of permanent male migration. We account for these
caste-level differences by estimating a flexible specification that allows for a caste-specific
ν parameter. The income-gain computed for households with migrants , using REDS and
NSS data as described above, does not vary substantially across castes. The important
difference is the point in the  distribution where these households are located. For a caste
with a strong network and many migrants, x in equation (10) is relatively large, which
implies that ν = 1/E() will be small. A strong urban caste network, reflected in a high
level of permanent migration in the data, thus effectively increases the income-gain from
migration. Despite the flexibility that is introduced with 100 ν parameters, the pattern of
λ’s and migration in Table 7B, Columns 5-6 is very similar to the benchmark estimates
obtained with a single ν parameter. Notice that the β coefficient is now smaller than one,
consistent with the standard assumption that migration reduces income-risk, although it
continues to be imprecisely estimated.
We assumed, when deriving the theoretical results, that there was a single ν and a single
β. The specifications reported in Columns 3-6 relax the first assumption. We now relax the
second assumption by allowing β to vary with rural household income (there is no reason to
allow β to vary by caste if households with migrants are excluded from their rural insurance
networks). Recall that β reflects the income diversification that accompanies migration as
well as access to non-network consumption-smoothing mechanisms. It is not obvious how
the reduction in income-risk through migration varies with rural income. While we would
expect wealthier households to have greater access to private credit, the effect on β is
theoretically ambiguous. Consider, for example, two households trying to smooth their
consumption with credit, where one household has twice as much income as the other in
each state of the world. To smooth consumption completely, the wealthier household must
receive twice as much credit in each state of the world. If land, the chief source of wealth
age adults, and the education of the household head are all generally increasing across income classes as
expected. Although the NSS data indicate that the rural-urban wage gap is increasing with education
(Hnatkovska and Lahiri 2013), wealthier households are starting from a higher rural income-base and so the
proportional gain in income will naturally be smaller for them. There is no obvious relationship between
absolute income and the income-gain from migration, which is reflected in the migration rate, in Table A3.
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in rural India, is not fully collateralizable, then this condition may or may not be satisfied
and the β-income relationship will be ambiguous.
The structural estimates in Table 7B, Columns 7-8 allow β to be a linear function of
average income in each relative income-class within each caste; β = α + γMAkj , without
any theoretical guidance about the sign of the γ parameter. Empirically, predicted mi-
gration rates were too high (low) for higher (lower) relative income-classes with a single
β parameter. With the flexible specification, we thus expect the gamma coefficient to be
positive to bring predicted migration in line with actual migration. The estimated coeffi-
cients in Columns 7-8 are consistent with this prediction. Since there are two parameters
to estimate – α and γ – we match on two moments: overall migration in the lowest and
the highest relative income class.40 It is reassuring to observe that predicted and actual
migration now match closely in the remaining three income-classes. We are even able to
generate the non-monotonicity from relative income-classes three to five, despite the fact
that β is specified to be increasing linearly in mean-income MAkj , without regard to the
relative position of group k in caste j.
To compare the parameter estimates with the flexible specification with what we ob-
tained earlier in Table 7A and Table 7B, Columns 3-6, we use the estimated α and γ
parameters to compute β for the representative household with mean-wealth in the REDS
census. Jack-knifed standard errors for the β parameter are constructed using the procedure
described above. The β parameter with the preferred flexible specification now lies below
one and is very precisely estimated. If we take a different approach that exploits variation
in household income in the sample, then the β parameter would be less than one (based on
the estimated α and γ parameters) for 86 percent of the households in the REDS census.
This result is consistent with evidence from the NSS indicating that employment-risk is
lower in urban than in rural areas, which implies (everything else equal) that income-risk
will be lower in urban areas. The fact that households facing greater rural income-risk
were nevertheless less likely to have migrant members in Table 6, indicates that the loss in
network insurance must be large enough to dominate the substantial income-gain and the
(possible) income risk-reduction associated with migration.
Given that the structural model appears to fit the data reasonably well, we use the
estimated parameter values to perform counter-factual simulations that quantify the mag-
nitude of the mobility restrictions we have uncovered. There are two structural parameters
in the model: the risk parameter, β, and the income-gain parameter, ν. We reduce the β
parameter to assess the effect of an improvement in formal insurance on migration, taking
as given the rural insurance arrangements that are in place. We assess the sensitivity of
migration to changes in the income-gain from migration by increasing the ν parameter.
40The standard errors for these two income classes in Column 10 simply reflect the sampling error that
is generated when we re-estimate the model, removing one caste at a time, in the jack-knife procedure.
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Figure 6 reports overall migration rates over a range of counter-factual β values, using
both the benchmark specification (single ν, single β) and the flexible specification (caste-
specific ν, β increasing in household income). A 50 percent decline in β, which is still quite
far from full insurance (β equal to zero) more than doubles the migration rate from 4 to 9
percent with the more precisely estimated flexible specification, highlighting the importance
of risk in restricting mobility. How responsive is migration to an exogenous change in the
income-gain from migration? Given historically low migration rates, despite the persistently
large wage gap in India, we would expect predicted migration to be insensitive to changes
in the income-gain if the model is correct. Counter-factual simulations in Figure 6 that
vary the value of the ν parameter, but retain the assumption that formal insurance is
unavailable, verify that this is indeed the case. An 80 percent increase in the ν parameter,
which corresponds to an average decline in the income-gain from 18 percent to 10 percent
lowers migration by just one percentage point. This result further emphasizes the central
message of this paper, which is that inadequate access to formal insurance, rather than
wage differentials as commonly assumed in models of migration, may explain much of the
low mobility in India.41
4.4 Testing the Mechanism
The key assumption underlying our theory is that permanent male migration is associated
with a loss in network services. We test this assumption by examining how a house-
hold’s relative wealth affects three variables: out-migration, network participation, and
out-marriage. Recall that marriage within the caste is a prerequisite for participation in
the network.
Each REDS round consists of a census of households in the representative sample of
villages, followed by a detailed survey of a sample of households in those villages. The
survey collects information on permanent migration by adult males, as in the census. In
addition, it collects information on financial transactions wihin the caste, which directly
measures participation in the insurance network, as well as marriage within the caste by
household members.42
41Counterfactual simulations reported in Appendix Figure A1 shift the ν parameter in the opposite
direction. A 50% decline in the ν parameter, which corresponds to a doubling of the wage-gap from 18%
to 36%, increases the migration rate by just 1.5% percentage points from a baseline of 4.3%. However,
migration is much more responsive to the wage-gap, in absolute and relative terms, when the β parameter
is halved from a baseline value of 1.4; migration increases from 6% to 9%.
42Participation in the caste network is measured by a binary variable that takes the value one if the
household sent or received caste-transfers (gifts or loans from one or more members of the same sub-caste)
in the year preceding each survey round. The measures of out-marriage and out-migration are constructed
from the 1999 retrospective histories on the marriages and migration of all of the siblings and children
of each household head in the sample. From these histories we created a variable indicating whether any
child of the household head married outside the caste in the 10-year period prior to each survey date. The
measure of out-migration is whether any male aged 20-30 at the time of each survey and residing in the
household prior to the survey had left the village permanently by the survey date.
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Although the number of households in the detailed survey is relatively small, a major
advantage over the census is that they can be linked over successive REDS rounds. We
thus construct a panel, using the surveyed households in the 1982 and 1999 rounds of the
REDS, for the joint test of the key theoretical assumption.43 We eliminate all castes with
less than 10 households in the REDS survey, and then proceed to estimate the following
equation:
Xit = pi1yit + pi2yit + fi + it, (11)
where yit is household i’s average income in survey round t (1982, 1999), yit is the corre-
sponding caste average, and fi is a household fixed effect. This is the same specification as
equation (9), except that household fixed effects and time subscripts are included. Equation
(11) is separately estimated with out-migration, out-marriage, and network participation
as dependent variables.
Average household income, yit, could be determined by unobserved household attributes
that independently determine the outcomes of interest. These attributes could also be
correlated with caste income, yit, to the extent that they are correlated across households
within the caste. Differencing over the two years allows us to purge these fixed attributes,
∆Xit = pi1∆yit + pi2∆yit + ∆it. (12)
However, shocks to income could still be correlated with unobserved changes in the de-
terminants of out-migration, out-marriage, and network participation ∆it; for example, if
schools, banks, or other infrastructure that independently changed incomes and the out-
comes of interest were introduced in the household’s village between 1982 and 1999. To
address this concern, we construct instruments for ∆yit, ∆yit in equation (12) above.
We make use of two technological features of the Indian Green Revolution to construct
these instruments: (i) only certain parts of the country could profit from the new HYV seeds
at the onset of the Green Revolution in the late 1960s, and (ii) the returns to investing in
the HYV technology are much greater on irrigated land. The instrumental variable strategy
allows for the possibility that initial availability of HYV technology and access to irrigation
were independently correlated with unobserved village and household characteristics that
had long-term effects on the outcomes of interest by including them in the second stage.
Exploiting the technological complementarity between HYV and irrigation, and the fact
that simultaneous access to these inputs was quasi-random, only the interaction of these
variables, measured in 1971, is used as an instrument for changes in income from 1982 to
1999. The instrument is constructed by interacting a binary variable indicating whether
43To construct the panel, we start with the sample of households in the 1982 round. Because of household
partitioning, many 1982 household members were distributed across multiple households in 1999. We thus
aggregate all 1999 households to be consistent with 1982 household boundaries, resulting in a balanced
panel over the two years.
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anyone in household i’s village used HYV in 1971 with the share of irrigated land in the
village in that year. These variables are obtained from the 1971 REDS round, which is
at the onset of the Green Revolution but still close enough in time to predict changes in
income over the 1982-1999 period.
All areas of the country did not benefit equally from the HYV technology at the onset of
the Green Revolution (see Munshi, 2004, for details). The early rice varieties, in particular,
were unsuitable for cultivation in many areas, and it was only by cross-breeding with local
varieties that the new technology could be adopted throughout the country. Although
the new wheat varieties were more robust, marketing was restricted to specific districts
in the early stages of the Green Revolution. Where the new HYV technology did become
available, credit constraints would have prevented growers from making the complementary
investments in irrigation that were required to exploit the enhanced potential of the new
seeds. Access to irrigation at that time would have been largely determined by proximity
to water bodies and pre-existing irrigation technologies like tanks and canals, which was
independent of the program priorities and technological constraints that determined access
to HYV. The simultaneous access to HYV technology and irrigation, conditional on access
to each of these inputs separately, can thus be treated as quasi-random (satisfying the
exclusion restriction). At the same time, the combination of these inputs, net of their
direct effects, would still have determined initial farm profits due to the fact that the new
HYV technology performed much better on irrigated land. Given credit constraints, these
initial profits would have determined the subsequently income trajectory and this is indeed
what we observe in the first-stage regression.44
The income variable that we construct depends on the household’s assets and the num-
ber of working age adults (including permanent migrants, if any). The same procedure was
used in the structural estimation to construct the income-gain from migration for house-
holds with migrants, except that we now use the village-level daily wage in the survey year
rather than the NSS wage to measure rural labor income. Caste-level income is once again
simply the caste average of household incomes. Note that we no longer need to impute
incomes or to restrict the sample to southern states, and so the results that follow serve as
a useful robustness test.
Table 8 reports the instrumental-variable estimates of equation (12). The Kleibergen-
Paap F statistics indicate that weak instruments are a concern (based on the Stock-Yogo
critical values), particularly with participation in the insurance network as the dependent
variable. This variable is measured in a single year prior to each survey round, which will
severely under-estimate the household’s actual involvement, especially since the demand for
44To add statistical power, we include two more instruments: the amount of land inherited by the house-
hold head, as reported in the 1982 REDS round, and the triple interaction of inherited wealth, HYV, and
irrigation. The corresponding caste-level instruments are the caste averages of the three household-level
instruments.
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major contingencies occurs relatively infrequently. This weakens the power of the instru-
ments. The estimates in Tables 8, particularly with network participation as the dependent
variable, should thus be treated with caution. They nevertheless support the joint hypoth-
esis that conditional on the household’s own income an increase in caste income reduces the
probability of out-migration and out-marriage, and simultaneously increases the probabil-
ity of participating in the insurance network.45 The point estimates with out-migration as
the dependent variable are larger in magnitude than what we obtained in Table 6, possibly
because the instruments purge measurement error in the income variables. However, the
pattern of coefficients remains the same and the key caste-income coefficient is precisely
estimated with all three outcomes. These results are difficult to reconcile with alternative
explanations that do not make a connection between caste networks and migration.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides an explanation for large spatial wage disparities and low male migra-
tion in India based on a combination of well-functioning rural insurance networks and the
absence of formal insurance. When men migrate permanently to work, they (and their
rural households) cannot credibly commit to honoring their future obligations at the same
level as households without migrants. They also have an incentive to misreport their urban
income. If the loss in network insurance due to these commitment and information prob-
lems is sufficiently severe, and alternative insurance is unavailable, then higher paying job
opportunities will go unexploited. Imperfections in the insurance market thus give rise to
a misallocation in the labor market.
We test this hypothesis by developing and estimating a model of ex ante mutual insur-
ance in which participation in the network and the income-sharing rule are jointly deter-
mined. The main theoretical results are (i) that income is redistributed in favor of relatively
poor households within the caste, which implies that relatively rich households (who ben-
efit less from the insurance network) should be more likely to have migrant members, and
(ii) that households facing greater rural income-risk (who benefit more from the network)
should be less likely to have migrant members. We find, using a variety of data sources
and estimation techniques, evidence that is consistent with these predictions. Structural
estimates of the model allow us to quantify the magnitude of the misallocation due to the
absence of formal insurance; a 50 percent improvement in risk-sharing for households with
migrant members would more than double the migration rate, from 4 to 9 percent.
Why does India have migration rates that are so much lower than other comparable
45Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors in Tables 8 are clustered at the state rather than the caste
level because our instruments are correlated with agricultural extension and irrigation programs at the
district level, and because the caste will often span a wide area covering multiple districts within but not
across states. Appendix Table A5 reports the first-stage parameter estimates.
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developing economies? In our framework, this could be because formal insurance, which
includes private credit and government safety nets, is particularly weak in India or because
informal insurance works particularly well there. There is no evidence suggesting that
credit markets work better in other low-income countries or that superior public safety
nets are available. Moreover, research on informal insurance has documented extremely
high levels of risk-sharing throughout the developing world, not just in India. There is,
however, more to consumption-smoothing than risk-sharing. If the size and geographic
scope of the network is small, as it often appears to be; e.g. Udry (1994), Fafchamps
and Lund (2003), Angelucci, De Giorgi, and Rasul (2014), then consumption will not be
smoothed appreciably even with full risk-sharing.46 What is exceptional about India is
the size and spatial-scope of the caste network, which appears to have given rise to an
equilibrium with strong rural insurance networks, weak formal insurance, and low mobility.
The model was developed to explain low mobility in India, but it is also useful in assess-
ing the mobility and distributional impacts of interventions that provide formal insurance
to rural households. One strategy would be to increase access to private credit, perhaps by
allowing rural households to collateralize their assets. In our model, this would result in a
decline in β for wealthier households. Figure 7 reports the results of a policy experiment
in which we proportionately reduce β in the top three absolute income classes, using the
flexible specification in Table 7, Columns 9-10.47 As can be seen, migration increases sub-
stantially for the highest relative income class as β declines. Although not reported, there
is a substantial increase in migration for the next two income classes as well. The accompa-
nying decline in the size of the network would adversely affect the ability of the households
that remain to smooth their consumption. More interestingly, there is a substantial re-
duction in redistribution within the caste, as a way of getting the wealthier households to
stay. For the lowest income class, for example, λ declines from 0.75 to 0.48, which is not
far from the sharing-rule without redistribution (λ = 0.31). Thus, while a credit program
may reduce the labor-market misallocation, it will have large and unintended negative dis-
tributional consequences for the lower income classes who continue to have low migration
rates. An evaluation of this credit program that failed to account for the interaction of
46To see why this is the case, consider a two-person network and a world with two income states: H
and L, that occur with equal probability and our distributed independently across individuals and over
time. With full risk-sharing, each individual consumes H with probability 1/4, L with probability 1/4, and
(H + L)/2 with probability 1/2, so there is still substantial variation in consumption. This variation will
decline, however, as the number of individuals in the network increases. It will also decline if incomes are
negatively correlated; i.e. if income-risk can be diversified, which will be the case if the network is more
dispersed.
47Access to credit depends on absolute (not relative) wealth. Each relative income class, k, within each
caste, j, is thus assigned to one of five absolute income classes on the basis of its mean income, MAkj . Recall
that the absolute income classes were constructed by sorting households in the REDS census by average
income, without regard to caste affiliation. We lower β ≡ α+ γMAkj for those relative income classes, kj,
that are in the top three absolute income classes in Figure 7. The counter-factual simulation that follows
in Figure 8 reduces β for relative income classes, kj, in the bottom two absolute income classes.
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the treatment with underlying informal institutions would be hard-pressed to explain why
consumption declined in the untreated group.
We can also use the structural estimates to assess an alternative policy intervention that
reduces β for lower absolute income classes. The policy in this case could be a government
employment guarantee scheme for the rural poor, such as India’s NREGA. If rural insurance
networks were ignored, one would expect such a scheme to improve the welfare of the
poor and reduce their migration from rural areas. What we observe instead in Figure 8,
consistent with our theory, is that migration is increasing for the lowest (treated) income
classes as β declines. Migration increases as much for the highest income class (which
does not benefit directly from the scheme) as the lowest income class. The migration rate
increases in the highest income class because the increased exit by the directly-targeted low
income households reduces the ability of the network to smooth consumption. Once again,
spillovers within the network have substantial impacts on household behavior.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 ∆M = 0 from equation (2). ∆R > 0 by assumption. The term
in parentheses in equation (4) is greater than zero. This implies, from assumption A1,
that F (∆M + ∆R) is greater than zero. F (∆M + ∆R) > N/P at N = 0. Moreover,
F (∆M + ∆R) is less than one from assumption A2. F (∆M + ∆R) < N/P at N = P .
F (∆M + ∆R) is increasing in N because RI is decreasing in N (hence, ∆R must be
increasing in N). By a continuity argument, a fixed point, N∗ ∈ (0, P ) at which equation
(4) is satisfied must exist.
From assumption A3, and given that dRI/dN < 0, d
2RI/dN
2 > 0 from equations (2)
and (3), F (∆M + ∆R(N)) is strictly concave:

















This implies that the fixed point, which satisfies equation (4), is unique to complete the
proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1 We first establish that a unique fixed point exists for the sharing
rule without redistribution.
Lemma 2. Equilibrium participation in each income class k ∈ {L,H} is characterized
by a unique fixed point, N∗k ∈ (0, Pk).
Without redistribution, ∆Mk = 0 from equation (5). As with the case without income
heterogeneity, we assume that ∆Rk > 0. The term in parentheses in equation (7) is
positive for both income classes. The right hand side of the equation is strictly positive
from assumption A1 and less than one from assumption A2. Following the same argument
as in Lemma 1, this implies that the F function must cross the Nk/Pk line in equation (7)
at least once.
For a unique fixed point to be obtained, we need in addition that the F function should
be strictly concave. The conditions for strict concavity corresponding to inequalities (13)
and (14) are







































Without redistribution, λk = MAk/MAK . It follows from equation (5) that MIk = MAk
and, hence, that dMIk/dNk = 0. Given assumption A3, the preceding inequalities will



















Given that RAk is the same (denoted by R) in all income classes, and that Nk is the same





































































The condition in equation (18) is binding. For the case with two income classes, assume
without loss of generality that MAL = M(1−θ), MAH = M(1+θ). We showed in Lemma 1
that there is a unique fixed point when θ = 0. We now show that the condition in equation










3θ2 − 2θ + 1 > 0.
The left hand side of the preceding inequality is positive for θ ≥ 0 (reaching a minimum
value of 2/3 at θ = 1/3) to complete the proof of Lemma 2.
The next step in proving Proposition 1 is to show that an increase in λ, evaluated at








where Ik = ∆Mk + ∆Rk.
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Differentiate W with respect to λ, applying Leibniz integral rule and noting that ∆Mk,











[Nm − PmImf(Im)] dIm
dNk
 dNkdλ
Nk = PkF (Ik) and so the terms in square brackets must be positive. Moreover, at λ =
MAL/MAH , IL = IH and NL − PLILf(IL) = NH − PHIHf(IH). Thus, the sign
of dW/dλ depends on dIk/dλ, dIm/dNk, dNk/dλ. We show below that dIL/dλ >|
dIH/dλ |, dIm/dNL > dIm/dNH , dNL/dλ >| dNH/dλ | to establish that dW/dλ > 0.

























At λ = MAL/MAH , NL = NH since the two income classes are of equal size. Since λ < 1,













We know from Lemma 2 that dMIm/dNk = 0 when there is no redistribution. We also know
from Lemma 2 that dRI/dNk < 0. We thus need to show that | dRI/dNL |>| dRI/dNH |.











2 because RAL = RAH by assumption. It follows that both
the left hand side (LHS) and the right hand side (RHS) of the preceding inequality are
increasing and convex functions of MAL/MAH . It is straightforward to verify that the LHS
starts above the RHS at MAL/MAH = 0, cuts it from above at MAL/MAH = NH/NL, and
then converges to the RHS from below at MAL/MAH = 1. The inequality, LHS > RHS,
is thus satisfied for MAL/MAH < NH/NL. NL = NH when λ = MAL/MAH . Since
MAL/MAH < 1 by construction, the preceding condition is always satisfied, ensuring that
| dRI/dNL |>| dRI/dNH |.
To show that dNL/dλ >| dNH/λ |, apply the Implicit Function theorem to the fixed-
















Recall from Lemma 2 that the slope of the F function is shallower than the slope of the
straight line, 1/Pk, at the fixed-point since it cuts it from above. This implies that the
denominator of the preceding equation must be positive for each income class, k ∈ {L,H}.
When λ = MAL/MAH , f(IL) = f(IH), d∆ML/dNL = d∆MH/dNH = 0, and as shown
above, | dRI/dNL |>| dRI/dNH |. PL = PH because income classes are of equal size.
This implies that the denominator must be smaller for the low income-class. Turning
to the numerator, we showed above that d∆MLdλ >| d∆MHdλ | at λ = MAL/MAH . Since
f(IL) = f(IH), the numerator of the preceding equation will be greater for the low
income-class (in absolute magnitude), reinforcing the difference in the denominator derived
above, to establish that dNL/dλ >| dNH/dλ |.
The indirect participation effect reinforces the direct effect, implying that dW/dλ is un-
ambiguously positive at λ = MAL/MAH . Thus, there must be redistribution in equilibrium,
λ∗ > MAL/MAH , to complete the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2 To prove Proposition 2, replace income classes, k ∈ {L,H}, with
risk classes, k ∈ {R,S}, and appropriately relabel key equations and inequalities that were


















[Nm − PmImf(Im)] dIm
dNk
 dNkdλ
We assumed when proving Proposition 1 that MAL < MAH , RAL = RAH . Since the
community is now divided by risk, we assume instead that RAR > RAS , MAR = MAS .
Without redistribution, λ = MAR/MAS = 1. ∆MR = ∆MS = 0. ∆RR > ∆RS . Given
that Ik = ∆Mk + ∆Rk, this implies that IR > IS . The  distribution, characterized by
the F function, is assumed to be the same in both risk classes. Risk classes are of equal
size; PR = PS . Since Nk = PkF (Ik), it follows that NR > NS . If the surplus increases
with redistribution, we will see below that λ can decline only as far as a threshold λ at
which NR = NS ; λ ∈ [λ, 1]. We evaluate dW/dλ at λ = 1 and λ = λ. We will see that the
sign of the derivative is ambiguous at λ = 1 but strictly positive at λ = λ.


























Without redistribution, λ = 1 and NR > NS . This implies that dIR/dλ <| dIS/dλ |.
Noting that Nk = PkF (Ik), it follows that NR − PRIRf(IR) > NS − PSISf(IS). The
direct effect of an increase in λ on W is consequently ambiguous. If the sign of the derivative
is positive, λ = 1 and NR > NS in equilibrium. If the sign of the derivative is negative, the
surplus can be increased by reducing λ, but only as long as NR > NS . As λ declines, the
gap between NR and NS declines. At λ < 1, IR = IS and NR = NS . From the equations




































































Without redistribution (λ = 1) we have already noted that d∆MIm/dNk = 0. With re-















Given that MAk is the same in all risk-classes, it is straightforward to show that dRI/dNk <












VAR(NR −NS) + 2NSVAS > 0.
NR ≥ NS for λ ∈ [λ, 1], which implies that this condition is always satisfied.












which is always satisfied since MAR = MAS and VAR > VAS .
For m ∈ {R,S}, d∆MIm/dNR = ∆MIm/dNS = 0 when λ = 1. d∆MIm/dNR >
d∆MIm/dNS when λ = λ. | dRI/dNR |>| dRI/dNS |. Thus, dIm/dNR > dIm/dNS for
λ = 1 and λ = λ. When λ = 1, IR > IS and NR − PRIRf(IR) > NS − PSISf(IS).
When λ = λ, IR = IS and NR − PRIRf(IR) = NS − PSISf(IS). The term in curly















At λ = 1, IR > IS , d∆Mk/dNk = 0, and | dRI/dNR |>| dRI/dNS |. At λ = λ,
IR = IS , d∆MR/dNR > d∆MS/dNS , and | dRI/dNR |>| dRI/dNS | The denominator
of the right hand side of the preceding equation is unambiguously smaller for the risky
class. However, without redistribution, d∆MR/dλ <| d∆MS/dλ |. The numerator is not
necessarily larger for the risky class. At λ, however, IR = IS , and we saw above that
d∆MR/dλ >| d∆MS/dλ |. It follows that dNR/dλ >| dNS/dλ |.
Each term on the right hand side of the dW/dλ equation is positive at λ = λ. This
implies that λ > λ in equilibrium and, hence, that NR > NS to complete the proof.
42
References
[1] Abramitzky, Ran. 2008. The Limits of Equality: Insights from the Israeli Kibbutz,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(3):1111-1159.
[2] Angelucci, Manuela, Gicomo De Giorgi, and Imran Rasul. 2014. Resource Pooling
within Family Networks: Insurance and Investment, University of Michigan typescript.
[3] Balakrishnan, P. and K. Pushpangadan. 1994. Total Factor Productivity Growth in
Manufacturing Industry in India: A Fresh Look, Economic and Political Weekly 29:
2028-2035.
[4] Banerjee, Abhijit and Andrew Newman. 1998. Information, the Dual Economy, and
Development, Review of Economic Studies 65: 631-653.
[5] Breza, Emily and Arun Chandrasekhar. 2015. Social Networks, Reputation and Com-
mitment: Evidence from a Savings Monitors Field Experiment, Stanford University,
typescript.
[6] Bryan, Gharad, Shyamul Chowdhury, and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak. 2014. Underin-
vestment in a Profitable Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh,
Economterica 82(5): 1671-1748.
[7] Buera, Francisco, Joseph P. Kaboski and Yongseok Shin. 2012. Finance and Develop-
ment: A Tale of Two Sectors, American Economic Review 101(5):1964-2002.
[8] Buera, Francisco and Yongseok Shin. 2013. Financial Frictions and the Persistence of
History: A Quantitative Exploration, Journal of Political Economy. 121(2):221-272.
[9] Caldwell, John C., P.H. Reddy, Pat Caldwell. 1986. Periodic High Risk as a Cause of
Fertility Decline in a Changing Rural Environment: Survival Strategies in the 1980-
1983 South Indian Drought, Economic Development and Cultural Change 677-701.
[10] Caselli, Francesco. 2005. Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences, in Hand-
book of Economic Growth ed. P. Aghion and S. Durlauf.
[11] Chandavarkar, Rajnarayan. 1994. The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India: Busi-
ness strategies and the working classes in Bombay, 1900-1940. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
[12] Chiquiar, Daniel and Gordon Hanson. 2005. International Migration, Self-Selection,
and the Distribution of Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States, Journal
of Political Economy 113(2): 239-281.
43
[13] Coate, Stephen and Martin Ravallion. 1993. Reciprocity without Commitment: Char-
acterization and Performance of Informal Insurance Arrangements, Journal of Devel-
opment Economics 40: 1-24.
[14] Deshingkar, Priya and Edward Anderson. 2004. People on the Move: New Policy Chal-
lenges for Increasingly Mobile Populations, Natural Resources Perspectives. Number
92, June. Overseas Development Institute.
[15] Fafchamps, Marcel and Susan Lund. 2003. Risk-Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines,
Journal of Development Economics 71(2):261-287.
[16] Foster, Andrew D. and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1995. Learning by Doing and Learning
from Others: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture, Journal of Political
Economy 103(6): 1176-1209.
[17] Foster, Andrew D. and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 2002. Household Division and Rural
Economic Growth, Review of Economic Studies 69(4): 839-869.
[18] Foster, Andrew D. and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 2008. Rural Non-Farm Employment Gen-
eration and Rural Out- Migration in South Asia, Handbook of Development Economics,
Vol. 4, North Holland.
[19] Genicot, Garance and Debraj Ray. 2003. Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrange-
ments, Review of Economic Studies 70(1): 87-113.
[20] Gollin, Douglas, David Lagakos, and Michael E. Waugh. 2014. The Agricultural Pro-
ductivity Gap, Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
[21] Grimard, Franque. 1997. Household Consumption Smoothing through Ethnic Ties:
Evidence from Cote d’Ivoire, Journal of Development Economics 53(3):319-422.
[22] Harris, John R. and Michael P. Todaro. 1970. Migration, Unemployment and Devel-
opment: A Two-Sector Analysis, American Economic Review 60(1):126-142.
[23] Hnatkovska, Viktoria and Amartya Lahiri. 2013. Structural Transformation and the
Rural-Urban Divide, University of British Columbia, typescript.
[24] Hsieh, Chang-Tai and Peter J. Klenow. 2009. Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP
in China and India, Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(4):1403-1448.
[25] Jackson, Matthew O., Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Xu Tan. 2012. Social Capital
and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Exchange, American Economic Review 102(5):
1857-1897.
44
[26] Lagos, Ricardo. 2006. A Model of TFP, Review of Economic Studies 73(4):983-1007.
[27] Ligon, Ethan. 1998. Risk-Sharing and Information in Village Economies, Review of
Economic Studies 65: 847-864.
[28] Ligon, Ethan, Jonathan P. Thomas and Tim Worrall. 2002. Informal Insurance Ar-
rangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies,
Review of Economic Studies 69:209-244.
[29] Lucas, Robert E.B. and Oded Stark. 1985. Motivations to Remit: Evidence from
Botswana, Journal of Political Economy 93(5): 901-918.
[30] Luke, Nancy and Kaivan Munshi. 2011. Women as Agents of Change: Female Income
and Mobility in India, Journal of Development Economics 94(1):1-17.
[31] Mazzocco, Maurizio and Shiv Saini. 2012. Testing Efficient Risk-Sharing with Hetero-
geneous Risk Preferences, American Economic Review 102(1): 428-468.
[32] McKenzie, David and Hillel Rapoport. 2007. Network Effects and the Dynamics of
Migration and Inequality: Theory and Evidence from Mexico, Journal of Development
Economics 84: 1-24.
[33] McKenzie, David and Hillel Rapoport. 2010. Self-Selection Patterns in Mexico-U.S.
Migration: The Role of Migration Networks, Review of Economics and Statistics 92(4):
811-821.
[34] Ministry of Home Affairs. 2011. Rural Urban Distribution of Population (Provisional
Population Totals), Census of India 2011.
[35] Moorjani, Priya, Kumarasamy Thangaraj, Nick Patterson, Mark Lipson, Po-Ru Loh,
Periyasamy Govindaraj, Bonnie Berger, David Reich, and Laiji Singh. 2013. “Genetic
Evidence for Recent Population Mixture in India,” American Journal of Human Ge-
netics 93(3):422-438.
[36] Morris, Morris David. 1965. The Emergence of an Industrial Labor Force in India:
A Study of the Bombay Cotton Mills, 1854-1947. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
[37] Morten, Melanie. 2012. Temporary Migration and Endogenous Risk Sharing in Village
India, Stanford University typescript.
[38] Munshi, Kaivan. 2004. Social Learning in a Heterogeneous Population: Technology
Diffusion in the Indian Green Revolution, Journal of Development Economics 73(1):
185-215.
45
[39] Munshi, Kaivan. 2011. Strength in Numbers: Networks as a Solution to Occupational
Traps, Review of Economic Studies 78:1069-1101.
[40] Munshi, Kaivan and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 2006. Traditional Institutions Meet the
Modern World: Caste, Gender and Schooling Choice in a Globalizing Economy. Amer-
ican Economic Review 96(4): 1225-1252.
[41] Olken, Benjamin and Monica Singhal. 2011. Informal Taxation, American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics 3(4): 1-28.
[42] Parente, Stephen L. and Edward C. Prescott. 1999. Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to
Riches, American Economic Review 89(5):1216-1233.
[43] Platteau, Jean-Marie. 2000. Institutions, Social Norms, and Economic Development,
Psychology Press.
[44] Restuccia, Diego and Richard Rogerson. 2008. Policy Distortions and AggregatePro-
ductivity with Heterogeneous Plants, Review of Economic Dynamics 11:707-720.
[45] Restuccia, Diego, D. T. Yang, and X. Zhu. 2008. Agriculture and Aggregate Pro-
ductivity: A Quantitative Cross-Country Analysis, Journal of Monetary Economics
55:234-250.
[46] Rosenzweig, Mark R. 1978. Rural Wages, Labor Supply, and Land Reform: A Theo-
retical and Empirical Analysis, American Economic Review 68(5): 847-861.
[47] Rosenzweig, Mark R. and Oded Stark. 1989. Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and
Marriage: Evidence from Rural India, Journal of Political Economy 97(4): 905-926.
[48] Rosenzweig, Mark R. and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 1993. Credit Market Constraints, Con-
sumption Smoothing, and the Accumulation of Durable Production Assets in Low-
Income Countries: Investments in Bullocks in India, Journal of Political Economy
101(2): 223-244.
[49] Saha, Sanjoy. 2014. Total Factor Productivity Trends in India: A Conventional Ap-
proach, The NEHU Journal 12(1): 95-106.
[50] Stark, Oded and J. Edward Taylor. 1991. Migration Incentives, Migration Types: The
Role of Relative Deprivation, em Economic Journal 101(408):1163-1178.
[51] Thomas, Duncan, Elizabeth Frankenberg and James P. Smith. 2001. Lost but not
forgotten: Attrition and follow-up in the Indonesia Family Life Survey, Journal of
Human Resources 36(3): 556-592.
46
[52] Townsend, Robert. 1994. Risk and Insurance in Village India. Econometrica 62(3):171-
84.
[53] Udry, Christopher. 1994. Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical
Investigation in Northern Nigeria. Review of Economic Studies 61(3): 495-526.
[54] UNDP. 2002. Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. Human Development
Report.
[55] Vollrath, Dietrich. 2009. How Important are Dual Economy Effects for Aggregate
Productivity? Journal of Development Economics 88(2): 325-334.
[56] Young, Alwyn. 2014. Inequality, the Urban-Rural Gap and Migration, Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics forthcoming.
47







 Urban 62.66 54.05 57.58
 Rural 42.54 42.54 42.54
 % gain 47.30 27.06 35.35
Source: National Sample Survey.
Wages are measured as daily wages for individuals with less than primary education.
PPP-adjustment is based on rural and urban consumption bundles, respectively, for
  those individuals.
 
wage
Table 2: Participation in the Caste-Based Insurance Arrangement
Survey year: 1982 1999
(1) (2)
Households participating (%) 25.44 19.62
Income of senders 5678.92 19956.29
(7617.55) (22578.95)
Percent of income sent 5.28 8.74
Income of receivers 4800.29 10483.84
(4462.63) (13493.68)
Percent of income received 19.06 40.26
Number of observations 4981 7405
Source: Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS) 1982 and 1999.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Participation in the insurance arrangement includes giving or receiving gifts and loans.
Participation measured over the year prior to each survey round.
Income is measured in 1982 Rupees.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share: 0.15 0.60 0.13 0.07 1.00
Source:
Bank 64.11 80.80 27.58 25.12 64.61
Caste 16.97 6.07 42.65 23.12 13.87
Friends 2.11 11.29 2.31 4.33 7.84
Employer 5.08 0.49 21.15 15.22 5.62
Moneylender 11.64 1.27 5.05 31.85 7.85
Other 0.02 0.07 1.27 0.37 0.22
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: 1982 Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS).
Statistics are weighted by the value of the loan and sample weights.
Statistics computed using 982 loans received in the year prior to the 1982 survey round.
Investment includes land, house, business, etc.
Operating expenses are for agricultural production.
Contingencies include marriage, illness, etc.
Other category not reported for Purpose.







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share: 0.25 0.46 0.21 0.04 1.00
Source:
Bank 46.79 62.49 18.78 19.82 46.70
Caste 7.82 4.11 19.64 14.24 9.12
Friends 6.01 3.33 8.28 7.09 5.38
Employer 3.31 0.54 1.11 1.85 1.23
Moneylender 20.69 12.82 46.80 53.65 24.67
Other 15.38 16.71 5.39 3.35 12.90
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: 2005 India Human Development Survey (IHDS).
Statistics are weighted by the value of the loan and sample weights.
Statistics computed using 12,066 rural loans received in the year prior to the 2005 IHDS.
IHDS 2005 reports loans received from relatives rather than caste.
Investment includes land, house, business, etc.
Operating expenses are for agricultural production.
Contingencies include marriage, illness, etc.
Other category not reported for Purpose.
2005 IHDS
Table 4: Percent of Loans by Type and Source
Data source: 2005 IHDS
Loan type: without interest without collateral
without collateral 
or interest without interest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Source:
Bank 0.57 23.43 0.38 0.00
Caste 28.99 60.27 20.38 44.62
Friends 9.35 91.72 3.89 21.5
Employer 0.44 65.69 0.44 10.75
Moneylender 0.00 98.71 0.00 0.27
Source: 1982 Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS) and 2005 India Human Development Survey (IHDS).
Statistics are weighted by the value of the loan and sample weights.
Columns 1-3 computed using 982 loans received in the year prior to the 1982 survey round.
Column 4 computed using 12,066 rural loans received in the 5 years prior to the 2005 IHDS.
IHDS 2005 reports loans received from relatives rather than caste.
The reference category is caste loans.
1982 REDS














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Relative Income class:
1 0.119 0.460 3.871 0.316 0.843 2.665 0.032
2 0.281 0.625 2.224 0.416 0.854 2.052 0.034
3 0.373 0.626 1.680 0.513 0.871 1.697 0.051
4 0.510 0.673 1.319 0.627 0.887 1.413 0.046
5 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.051
Note: Income classes are defined by quintiles within each caste.
Income and consumption are measured relative to the highest (fifth) income class.
REDS 2006 income and consumption are inputted from ICRISAT data.
REDS data consists of 100 castes, while ICRISAT data consist of 7 castes. 
Sample-size restriction is at least 30 households per caste with REDS data and 20 households per caste with ICRISAT data. 
ICRISAT REDS 2006
Table 6: Reduced-Form Migration Estimates 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Household Income 0.0059 0.0051 0.0026 0.0025 0.0021 0.0021
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0033)
Caste Income -0.016 -0.018 -0.022 -0.024 -0.025 -0.017
(0.0043) (0.0055) (0.008) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.014)
Income Risk -- -0.00038 -0.00037 -0.00053 -0.00053 -0.00053
(0.00015) (0.00016) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00011)
Village Income 0.007 0.006 -- --
(0.011) (0.013) -- --
Village/ Caste Income 0.0073 0.0088
(0.013) (0.027)
Village Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes
Infrastructure Variables No No No Yes Yes No
Joint sig. of infrastructure variables:
χ2 -- -- -- 16.14 16.59 --
-- -- -- [0.0011] [0.00090] --
Number of observations 19,362 19,362 19,362 19,362 19,362 19,362
Source: 2006 Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS) census.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the caste level in Columns 1 - 2 and 6 and two-way clustered at the caste
  and village level in Columns 3 - 5.
Income measured in lakhs of Rupees, (1 lakh = 100,000).
Infrastructure variables : whether there is a bank, secondary school, health center, or bus station in the village, as well as distance to the 
  nearest town. 
chi-square p-value reported in square brackets.
Sample-size restricted to castes with at least 30 households. 
migration





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative Income Class:
1 0.843 0.032 0.801 0.000
(0.071) (0.00020)
2 0.854 0.034 0.817 0.014
(0.070) (0.0073)
3 0.871 0.051 0.834 0.039
(0.063) (0.0083)
4 0.887 0.046 0.868 0.060
(0.044) (0.0089)




Source: 2006 Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS) census.
Structural estimation is based on 100 castes with at least 30 households in the census.
Relative income classes are defined by quintiles within each caste. 
Consumption is measured relative to the highest (fifth) income class in Columns 1 and 3.
Relative consumption and migration are computed as the average in each income-class across all castes.














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative Income Class:
1 0.843 0.032 0.794 0.000 0.751 0.000 0.730 0.032
(0.058) (0.00018) (0.097) (0.000081) (0.083) (0.0095)
2 0.854 0.034 0.810 0.014 0.767 0.011 0.744 0.032
(0.059) (0.0075) (0.092) (0.010) (0.064) (0.052)
3 0.871 0.051 0.827 0.039 0.792 0.029 0.765 0.046
(0.053) (0.0088) (0.070) (0.025) (0.055) (0.027)
4 0.887 0.046 0.863 0.060 0.842 0.055 0.825 0.044
(0.038) (0.0095) (0.044) (0.033) (0.037) (0.013)
5 1.000 0.051 1.000 0.101 1.000 0.119 1.000 0.051
(0.019) (0.062) (0.0074)




Source: 2006 Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS) census.
Structural estimation is based on 100 castes with at least 30 households in the census.
Relative income classes are defined by quintiles within each caste. 
Consumption is measured relative to the highest (fifth) income class in Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7.
Relative consumption and migration are computed as the average in each income-class across all castes.
Jackknifed standard errors in parentheses.
We match on two moments - migration in the lowest and the highest relative income class - in the flexible specification (Columns 7-8).
Standard errors for those two income classes in Column 8 thus reflect sampling error due to the jack-knife procedure.
β = α + γMak in Columns 7-8. The estimated α and γ parameters are used to compute β for the representative household with mean-wealth in the REDS census.
actual
predicted (ν varies by        







Table 8: FE-IV Migration, Out-Marriage, and Participation Estimates
Data source:
Dependent variable: migration out-marriage network participation
(1) (2) (3)
Household income 0.262 0.166 -0.520
(0.147) (0.102) (0.684)
Caste income -0.110 -0.111 0.327
(0.053) (0.054) (0.173)
Time trend 0.059 0.026 0.014
(0.020) (0.011) (0.123)
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 10.52 8.05 10.52
Number of observations 1,049 998 1,049
Wild cluster bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Income is constructed using wealth- and wage-based measure. 
Income measured in lakhs of Rupees, (1 lakh = 100,000).
Additional regressors: whether anyone in the village used HYV and share
  of village land irrigated in 1971 (household and caste average).  
Excluded variables: inherited land, interaction of any HYV and irrigation 
 share, interaction of inherited land, any HYV and irrigation share 
  (household and caste average).
 households with heads at least age 18 in 1982.
Stock-Yogo weak ID test: 5% critical value 15.72, 10% critical value 9.48.
Sample restricted to castes with at least 10 households in the panel and 
Source: Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS) panel, 1982 and 1999.
1982 REDS
Table A1: Rural-Urban Wage Gaps in India over Time
wage gap (%)
rural urban rural urban rural urban  
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1983 5.94 9.96 81.90 111.20 24.81 40.17 61.92
1993 17.66 28.79 177.11 258.00 34.11 50.05 46.75
1999 34.80 54.29 309.00 428.00 38.52 56.90 47.73
2004 42.54 62.66 342.00 520.00 42.54 54.05 27.04
2009 80.74 104.70 530.00 754.70 52.10 62.23 19.44
Source: Nominal wage per day is derived from NSS.
Consumer Price Index (CPI) is based on Government of India statistics.
Conversion to real wage in 2004 is based on representative rural consumption bundle in that year. 
CPI is used to adjust wages in other years.
nominal wage consumer price index real wage
Table A2: Loan Characteristics by Source
Dependent Variable: 












Number of Observations 1045 1045
Note: The other categories are not reported.
Observations are weighted by the value of the loan and sample weights.
Caste is the omitted source in these regressions.
loan type











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Absolute Income class:
1 0.023 38084.74 1.462 4.684 0.218 0.043 19.609
2 0.040 35956.19 1.451 3.909 0.228 0.010 27.352
3 0.051 114863.00 1.656 3.744 0.179 0.024 28.030
4 0.100 129849.50 1.777 5.083 0.190 0.051 21.576
5 0.894 90414.75 1.950 4.741 0.166 0.026 27.329
Source: 2006 Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS) census.
Absolute income classes are defined by quintiles across the entire income distribution, without regard to caste affiliation.
Household income based on assets, number of working adults, education (from REDS) and rural, urban wages (from NSS).
Income-gain is computed assuming a single member of the household migrates.
Migration rate is obtained from the REDS, and together with the income-gain from migration, is used to derive the ν parameter.
Table A4: Structural Estimates with 4 and 6 Relative Income-Classes










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative Income class:
1 0.857 0.031 0.817 0.000 0.831 0.033 0.785 0.000
(0.059) (0.0008) (0.052) (0.0000)
2 0.880 0.042 0.837 0.022 0.837 0.027 0.797 0.013
(0.058) (0.0084) (0.052) (0.0073)
3 0.894 0.048 0.866 0.051 0.854 0.050 0.812 0.025
(0.044) (0.0077) (0.049) (0.0106)
4 1.000 0.050 1.000 0.097 0.854 0.047 0.829 0.043
(0.0138) (0.045) (0.0110)
5 -- -- -- -- 0.883 0.047 0.867 0.064
(0.037) (0.0102)
6 -- -- -- -- 1.000 0.053 1.000 0.113
(0.0178)
overall 0.043 0.043 0.043 0.043
(0.0060) (0.0063)
β
Source: 2006 Rural Economic Development Survey (REDS) census.
Structural estimation is based on 100 castes with at least 30 households in the census.
Four and six equal-sized income classes are constructed within each caste. 
Benchmark specification (single v) in all estimations.
Consumption is measured relative to the highest income class in Column 1 and Column 5.
Relative consumption and migration are computed as the average in each relative income-class across all castes.





Table A5: First-Stage Estimates 








  (1)   (2)   
Anyone in the village used HYV (household) -2787.65 20369.17 
(3719.06) (17642.30) 
Anyone in the village used HYV (caste average) -3348.87 -42467.91 
(4990.63) (39691.53) 
Share of village land irrigated (household) -56.24 5578.18 
(4063.92) (9886.26) 
Share of village land irrigated (caste average) -4094.89 -22929.07 
(3144.29) (32659.12) 
HYV*irrigation share (household) 1844.46 -26942.14 
(5847.23) (22377.58) 
HYV*irrigation share (caste average) -1646.46 24413.53 
(6428.40) (45272.26) 
inherited land (household) 3.48 -5.32 
(1.12) (4.55) 
inherited land (caste average) 6.48 24.11 
(7.88) (43.01) 
HYV*irrigation share*inherited land (household) 3.44 6.58 
(6.06) (14.78) 
HYV*irrigation share*inherited land (caste 
average) 41.09 140.68 
(19.56) (37.31) 
Constant 8084.81 25683.28 
(2828.20) (20544.49) 
F statistic (excluded variables) 104.96 12.28 
p-value 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.02 0.07 
Number of observations 2335 2335 
          
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to clustering at the state level. 
Dependent variables are computed as the change between 1982 and 1999. 
Income is constructed using a wealth-based measure. 
Excluded variables: HYV*irrigation, inherited land, HYV*irrigation*inherited land  
  (household and caste average) 
Regressions restricted to castes with at least 10 households in sample and households 
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Figure 2. Real Rural and Urban Wages in India 
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Figure 3. Change in Rural-Urban Migration Rates in India, 1961- 2001 










China Indonesia India Nigeria
1975 2000
Figure 4. Change in Percent Urbanized, by Country, 1975-2000 
Source: UNDP 2002 
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Percent Decrease in Beta (third, fourth and fifth absolute income-classes) 
lambda 
(lowest class)  
migration 
(highest class)  
migration 
(lowest class)  





























































Percent decrease in ν 
beta = .705
beta = 1.41
Figure A1. Counter-Factual Simulations 
